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INTRODUCTION
Political leaders hailed the North American Free Trade
Agreement1 (“the NAFTA”) as a breakthrough trade pact when it
became operative on January 1, 1994.2  That the NAFTA was viewed
in this light was due in large part to the existence of labor3 and
environmental side agreements,4 in addition to the NAFTA’s actual
trade provisions.5  The trade agreement created the world’s largest
continental free trade zone,6 stretching from the Arctic Circle to the
Yucatan Peninsula.7  The NAFTA free trade zone encompasses a
population of 370 million people8 and a production output of 6.5
trillion U.S. dollars.9
                                                       
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (“NAFTA”), Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1994)).  President
Bush signed the final NAFTA treaty on December 17, 1992.  See Betty Southard Murphy,
NAFTA’s North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation:  The Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 403, 403 n.2 (1995).  The U.S. House of Representatives ratified the NAFTA
implementing legislation on November 17, 1993, and the Senate ratified it on November 20,
1993.  See Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question:  NAFTA and
Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 128 (1993) (describing the
passage of Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)); Murphy, supra, at 403 n.2.  President
Clinton signed the legislation on December 8, 1993.  See Compa, supra, at 128.
2. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 404 (providing background information about the
NAFTA); infra note 5 (providing President Clinton’s characterization of the pact).
3. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 8,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
4. See North American Agreement on Environment Cooperation, 32 I.L.M. 1980 (1993).
The NAFTA labor and environmental side agreements are two “companion” treaties that
Mexico, Canada and the United States negotiated as supplementary parts of the NAFTA
“package.”  See Murphy, supra note 1, at 403.  The side agreements came into effect on the same
date as the NAFTA and concern labor and environmental problems that result from economic
activity taking place inside of the NAFTA free trade zone.  See id. at 405-06.
5. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 405-06 (citing President Clinton’s description of the
NAFTA as “historic” because it included the North American Agreement on Labor
Competition); see also David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize in the United States, Canada, and
Mexico:  A Comparative Assessment, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 537, 539 (1993) (noting President
Clinton’s support of the NAFTA before ratification).
Previous U.S. trade legislation has included provisions concerning respect for workers’ rights
in other countries.  See, e.g., International Trade and Investment Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994);
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1994);
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1994);
Customs and Trade Act of 1990, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994); Compa, supra note 1, at 138-44
(describing the use of the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act’s labor rights
protection provisions against Guatemala in 1992 and 1993 by the United States); Karen F.
Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. INT’L
L. 173, 180 (1992) (characterizing the fear of low wages in foreign countries as motivation for
including internationally-acknowledged workers’ rights in U.S. trade legislation).  The NAFTA,
however, is the first multilateral trade agreement to which the United States has been a party
that makes trade explicitly conditioned on workers’ rights in other countries.  See Murphy, supra
note 1, at 406.





The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“the
NAALC”) is the labor side agreement in the NAFTA package.10  After
the three nations finished negotiating the NAFTA in 1992, labor
groups and U.S. politicians feared that the NAFTA would result in
hardships for U.S. workers in industries affected by the expanded
movement of goods and capital across international borders.11  As a
result, they pushed the signatories to develop the NAALC as a
supplement to the NAFTA in order to link expanded free trade with
the protection of labor rights.12  As a result of public concern and
pressure by the U.S. government,13 representatives of the three
member nations negotiated the NAALC in the first half of 1993,14
presented the final document for signatures in September 1993,15 and
included it in the final NAFTA package that went into force on
January 1, 1994.16
The NAALC is important because it is the first international trade
agreement in which the United States has included labor
protections.17  The Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. trade negotiators
and policy makers who created the NAFTA and the NAALC, however,
                                                       
10. See NAALC, supra note 3, Preamble, pt. 1.
11. See Sherri M. Durand, American Maquiladoras:  Are They Exploiting Mexico’s Working Poor?,
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1994, at 128, 128 (characterizing NAFTA opponents in the
United States as afraid that U.S. corporations would cause U.S. workers to lose jobs by moving
production facilities to Mexico); Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor Cooperation Agreement Among
Mexico, Canada, and the United States:  Its Negotiation and Prospects, 3 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 121, 125
(1995) (describing U.S. labor’s opposition to the NAFTA); Murphy, supra note 1, at 404-05
(stating that U.S. opponents’ concerns included potential downward pressures on U.S. wages
and workplace safety standards).
12. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 405-06 (describing U.S. efforts to condition expanded
trade on the inclusion of workers’ rights); cf. Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125 (stating that U.S.
labor unions opposed the NAFTA throughout its debate and passage because they were
dissatisfied with the NAALC).
13. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 122-23 (describing the congressional Democratic
pressure on President Bush to develop clear labor protections when Bush sought fast track
authority for the NAFTA in 1991); Murphy, supra note 1, at 405 (describing pro-NAALC
pressure by U.S. labor, members of Congress, and President Clinton).
14. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125 (describing newly-elected President Clinton’s
efforts to fulfill campaign promises to alleviate the NAFTA’s effects on U.S. workers); Murphy,
supra note 1, at 405 (describing the influence of various parties on the final side agreement
regarding labor).
15. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125 (describing the passage of the NAALC).
16. See id. at 122-25 (explaining the history of the NAALC).
17. See id. at 121 (characterizing the NAALC as the first binding international instrument
in which international labor and trade agreements have been both politically and legally
connected); Murphy, supra note 1, at 406 (claiming that no previous U.S. trade agreement has
specifically conditioned expanded trade with protection of labor rights).
The concept of linking expanded international trade to the protection and recognition of
workers’ rights is an idea that has been gaining acceptance throughout the world for some
time.  See Compa, supra note 1, at 117 (highlighting the growing influence of labor rights
groups on the discourse of international trade); Herzstein, supra note 11, at 122 (describing
discussions about trade’s effects on workers during General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) negotiations since World War II).
did not design the agreement with adequate consideration for the
needs of many workers who are affected by the increased flow of
international trade created by the agreement.18
One such group, that may benefit somewhat from the NAALC but
whose needs were not fully addressed by the agreement, is composed
of women who work in Mexican maquiladora19 factories.20  The term
maquiladora generally refers to large foreign-owned factories in
Mexico where workers perform assembly work on components
imported from other countries.21  The finished products are generally
shipped back to the components’ nation of origin for sale.22  The
benefit of maquiladora assembly is that it allows producers to take
advantage of low-cost Mexican labor.23  Maquiladoras first developed
as a result of the bilateral United States-Mexican Border
Industrialization Program of 1964 (“the BIP”), the goal of which was
to develop industry and promote employment along the border.24
The BIP agreement established favorable trade conditions for U.S.
companies that built and operated assembly and finishing factories in
Northern Mexico,25 and led to a proliferation of U.S.-controlled
industrial enterprises along the border and throughout Mexico.26
                                                       
18. See David Bacon, Laboring to Cross the NAFTA Divide, THE NATION, Nov. 13, 1995, at 573
(contending that NAFTA negotiators failed to consider adequately the interests of workers).
19. See Durand, supra note 11, at 128-29 (explaining that the term “maquilar” is a Spanish
verb that means “to perform a task for another”).
20. No single perspective accurately or comprehensively represents the views of all female
workers, or even a single group of female workers.  See CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES, AND
BASES:  MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 199 (1989).  There are, however,
certain experiences that women tend to have in common, despite differences in nationality and
culture.  See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L.
613, 616 (1991) (articulating the need to include women’s distinctive “experiences” in
international law).  These common experiences revolve around women’s unique, socially
constructed responsibility for bearing and rearing children, providing meals for the members
of the family, and maintaining the living conditions and health of the household.  See id. at 626.
21. See Durand, supra note 11, at 128 (discussing the Mexican maquiladora industry).
22. See id. at 129.
23. See id.
24. See JOSEPH GRUNWALD & KENNETH FLAMM, THE GLOBAL FACTORY:  FOREIGN ASSEMBLY
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 138 (1985) (describing the establishment and growth of maquiladora
operations in Mexico); Susanna Peters, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras:  Choosing Between Workers’
Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 226, 228-30 (1990) (recounting the history of
Border Industrialization Program of 1964); see also Durand, supra note 11, at 129 (claiming that
Mexico’s incentives for establishing maquiladoras were increased employment, higher incomes,
improved standards of living, and greater labor skills through the use of new technology).
25. See GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at 138.  The original plan created a twenty
kilometer strip along the border between El Paso, Texas and Cuidad Juárez, Mexico that
eliminated tariffs on the import and export of industrial machinery and components.  See id.
Industrial corporations shipped their already fabricated products to maquiladora factories in
the duty-free zone for assembly by Mexican workers, and re-imported them to the United States.
See id.
26. See id.  Initially, maquiladora products had to be re-exported to the United States, but
Mexican legislation later permitted their distribution in Mexico.  See id.  Corporations have also
been permitted to build maquiladora factories throughout Mexico, not just in the Cuidad
Today, hundreds of maquiladoras exist throughout Mexico27 and
employ approximately one million workers.28  Women comprise a
significant percentage of maquiladora workers.29  Maquiladora
working conditions merit concern because maquiladora workers,
including women, often receive very low wages,30 work in unsafe
conditions,31 and are either not represented by unions32 or are
represented by ineffective unions that do little to promote the welfare
of their constituents.33  These workers have had some success in
                                                       
Juárez area.  See id.; Durand, supra note 11, at 129.  In 1972, Mexico decided to permit
maquiladoras everywhere except Mexico City.  See Durand, supra note 11, at 129.  Cuidad
Juárez, across the border from El Paso, Texas, and Tijuana, across the border from San Diego,
California, currently have the highest numbers of maquiladoras.  See id.  The Mexican
government has also relaxed its majority native ownership requirements for maquiladoras and
now permits 100% foreign ownership in all but the apparel and textile sectors.  See Peters, supra
note 24, at 229.
27. See Robert Collier, NAFTA Labor Problems Haunt New Trade Debate, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10,
1997, at A1; see also Peters, supra note 24, at 227 (stating that maquiladoras are Mexico’s second
largest source of foreign currency, behind oil, and they earn two billion U.S. dollars per year).
28. See Peters, supra note 24, at 233-34 (stating that about one million workers were
employed in 1995, which was three times the level of maquiladora employment that existed in
1985).
29. See Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (reporting that in some areas as many as three-
quarters of maquiladora employees are female).
30. See id.; Dianne Solis, Reorganizing Mexico:  As Mexico Struggles, New Unions Strike Back,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1996, at A9 (reporting that average wage increases in 1996 were 19%, in
comparison with a 27% to 30% rate of inflation).  Most maquiladora workers receive the
Mexican minimum wage, which has not kept pace with inflation since 1977.  See Durand, supra
note 11, at 131.
31. See Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (reporting findings by the U.S. government that
several U.S.-owned maquiladoras lacked adequate safety training programs and corporate safety
policies).
32. See id. at 130 (estimating that only 36% of Mexican workers are unionized).
33. In general, few maquiladora workers are unionized, and the unions that do exist are
not effective advocates for their members.  See Peters, supra note 24, at 240.  Article 123 of the
Mexican Constitution gives workers the right to form labor organizations and guarantees basic
labor rights, including maximum hours per work week, maternity leave provisions, minimum
wage levels, safe working conditions, profit sharing by companies with their employees, the
right to strike, and equal pay without regard to sex.  See CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, tit. VII, art. 123, pt. A, cited in Gregory, supra note 5, at 552-53.
The right to job security is also codified in Mexican law.  See id. pt. B, ch. IX, cited in Gregory,
supra note 5, at 553.
Despite the appearance of strong legal protections, however, workers’ rights are undermined
by the structure of the Mexican labor movement, which is dominated by the Mexican Workers
Federation (known by its Spanish initials, “CTM”).  See Gregory, supra note 5, 552-53 (stating
that the CTM accounts for 70% of organized employees in Mexico).  The CTM has close ties
with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (known by its Spanish initials, “PRI”) which has
caused the CTM to sacrifice workers’ concerns to the economic interests of political elites.  See
Manuel Fuentes Muniz, The NAFTA Labor Side Accord in Mexico and its Repercussions for Workers, 10
CONN. J. INT’L L. 379, 379-80 (1995).  The PRI has pursued a policy of non-enforcement of
labor laws in order to make Mexican labor cheaper and more attractive to foreign investors,
and the CTM has not opposed this tactic.  See id. at 380-81 (describing the labor practices of
multinational corporations that violate Mexican law and the unwillingness of Mexican
authorities and the CTM to condemn such behavior); Peters, supra note 24, at 227 (claiming
that the Mexican government has adopted a “hands off” approach to labor regulation of
maquiladoras).  The U.S. government has reported that Mexican governmental actions have
attracting attention to their problems, and several Mexican and U.S.
groups now advocate on their behalf.34  Female maquiladora workers’
efforts to improve factory work, however, are hampered by their
economic needs and the lack of other job opportunities, which force
the women to accept poor maquiladora working conditions.35  As
such, although this particular group of women possesses its own
unique characteristics and problems, it also shares many concerns
with women around the world, including gender-based
discrimination and the perpetuation of inequality in international
agreements.
This Comment will examine how the NAFTA and the NAALC’s
negotiation process excluded the needs and concerns of female
Mexican maquiladora workers36 and will discuss the negative effects
that the NAFTA and the NAALC have had on Mexican female
maquiladora workers.  Part I will discuss how the NAFTA and NAALC
negotiation process, especially U.S. congressional activity, excluded
the concerns of female maquiladora workers.  Part II addresses the
specific provisions of the NAFTA and the NAALC that exclude or
detrimentally affect these laborers.  Part III examines how the
agreements have tangibly affected women working in maquiladora
factories and surveys relevant cases that unions and human rights
                                                       
weakened the power of workers, and that the CTM is too closely tied to existing political
institutions to lobby effectively on behalf of labor interests.  See Muniz, supra, at 385.
Mexican labor authorities are especially notorious for not enforcing labor standards in
maquiladoras.  See Peters, supra note 24, at 236-43.  Particular issues of non-enforcement
include violations of reasonable cause requirements for employee dismissals and violations of
profit-sharing laws.  See id. at 236-39.  Maquiladora managers are also known for employing
aggressive anti-union tactics.  See Muniz, supra, at 388.  Some maquiladora managers establish
“ghost” or “blank” unions, which do nothing to further workers’ interests and which pre-empt
the formation of legitimate, pro-worker unions.  See id.  Employees who attempt to organize
independent unions face dismissal and blacklisting by maquiladora managers, who view them as
potential troublemakers.  See id. at 389; Solis, supra note 30, at A9 (noting that employers dislike
independent unions because they are more willing to strike).
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, NO GUARANTEES:  SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN MEXICO’S MAQUILADORA SECTOR 58 (1996) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, NO GUARANTEES] (acknowledging the work on behalf of maquiladora workers by
American women’s and labor rights groups like Human Rights Watch and the American
Friends Service Committee, and Mexican women’s and labor rights groups like the Comité de
Obreras Fronterizas, the Casa de la Mujer Grupo Factor X, and the Casa de la Mujer y Lugar de
la Tijuana).
35. See id. at 2 (outlining the paucity of employment opportunity alternatives available to
maquiladora workers).
36. See Ann K. Nauman and Mireille Hutchison, The Integration of Women Into the Mexican
Labor Force Since NAFTA, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 950, 951 (1997) (reporting that NAFTA
negotiators did not treat sex equality as a priority).
Men have traditionally dominated the creation of international law.  See ENLOE, supra note
20, at 114-15, 120-23 (discussing the male-dominated atmospheres of U.S. and British foreign
service corps. and the World Bank); FILOMINA C. STEADY & REMIE TOURÉ, WOMEN AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 5 (1995) (describing the slow pace of women’s advancement in senior, policy-
making positions of the United Nations).
groups have brought before NAALC enforcement bodies.  Finally,
Part IV offers recommendations for making the NAFTA and the
NAALC more responsive to the concerns and needs of female
maquiladora workers.
I. EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM NAFTA AND NAALC NEGOTIATIONS
Two factors combined to exclude the interests of female
maquiladora workers from the negotiation process and final
provisions of the NAFTA and the NAALC.  First, social and cultural
pressures traditionally have marginalized women and their concerns
from international law instruments, such as the NAFTA and the
NAALC.37  Second, the signatory governments negotiated the NAALC
and the NAFTA under circumstances38 that failed to provide adequate
opportunities for influence from groups that were aware of, and
concerned about, the agreement’s potential effect on female
maquiladora workers.39
A. The Effects of the Public-Private Dichotomy on Negotiations
One of the primary reasons that Mexican women, including
maquiladora workers, did not have meaningful representation during
the formation of the NAFTA and the NAALC is the “public-private”
dichotomy that exists between men’s and women’s gender-defined
roles in Mexican culture.40  Mexican culture assigns women as a
                                                       
37. See, e.g., ENLOE, supra note 20, at 4 (describing the traditional characterization of
international law as a “masculine” area); NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE STATUS OF WOMEN 2-3 (1983) (noting the states’ reluctance to include “women’s” issues in
international legal instruments); STEADY & TOURÉ, supra note 36, at 76-77 (suggesting that U.N.
institutions should find ways to make women’s informal economic activities more widely
recognized); Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 622 (criticizing women’s absence from
international organizations and governmental bodies that create international law); Karen
Knop, Re/Statements:  Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 295 (1993) (characterizing women as invisible in international law
because they fall under the jurisdiction of national sovereignty and thus are not viewed as
appropriate subjects for international regulation); Shelley Wright, Women and the Global
Economic Order:  A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 861, 875 (1995) (explaining
that international law excludes women’s concerns because of beliefs about women’s proper role
in society).
38. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125 (stating that the NAALC was negotiated and
presented for signatures in a matter of months).
39. See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation:  The Evolving
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 983-85 (1996) (describing the
limiting effect that fast track procedures had on public debate).
40. See Catherine T. Barbieri, Women Workers in Transition:  The Potential Impact of the NAFTA
Labor Side Agreements on Women Workers in Argentina and Chile, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 526, 527 (1996)
(reviewing the public-private division of labor that exists throughout Latin America).  Activities
that women perform in the public sphere, such as paid labor, community activism and political
participation, are largely ignored because of the perception that women only work at home.  See
id. at 527; Knop, supra note 37, at 329-30 (discussing the separation between the “public world
group to the “private” realms of home, domestic life and child-
rearing,41 and characterizes men as actors who control the “public”
areas of government and economic activity, and provide financial
support for their wives and children.42  Mexican men tend to function
in the highly visible world of business and economic activity and
receive monetary compensation for these activities,43 enabling them
to attract public recognition both for issues that affect them and for
the fruits of their labor.44  Mexican women, on the other hand, are
expected to assume primary responsibility for childrearing and other
work that takes place in the home, where they receive less
acknowledgment of their work45 and receive no financial
compensation for their household-related labor.46  This perception of
                                                       
of work and commerce” and the “private world of home and family”); Wright, supra note 37, at
861-62 (describing studies that show the impact of gender on labor roles throughout the world,
in which women have responsibility for domestic tasks).  Although variations exist regarding
women’s responsibility for economic production, their economic activities do not necessarily
decrease domestic responsibilities.  See Wright, supra note 37, at 861-62.  See generally
RECONCEIVING REALITY:  WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993)
[hereinafter Dallmeyer] (explaining how international law is shaped by the public-private
dichotomy, which results in the exclusion of women and family-related issues from
international legal instruments).
41. See WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND DEVELOPMENT 331 (Huguette Dagenais et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Dagenais] (explaining the traditional Latin American expectation that a woman
will move directly from her parents’ house to her husband’s house, where she will begin her
career as wife and mother); see also Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 626 (claiming that the
identification of women as private sphere actors is “universal”).
42. See GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER IN THE THIRD WORLD 277 (Janet Henshall Momsen et al.
eds. 1987) [hereinafter GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER].  The Mexican labor market is structured in
favor of men because of cultural assumptions that men are responsible for supporting women
and children.  See id.  Working men are not always reliable supporters, however, because they
sometimes choose to spend their income on themselves instead of supporting their families.  See
id. at 288.
43. See id. (asserting that men’s power is founded on their economic supremacy); Wright,
supra note 37, at 862 (theorizing that men generally can pass freely between private and public
worlds, but women are confined to the private sphere).  Throughout the world, men historically
have had the time to work outside the home and earn money because women have relieved
them of the burden of domestic-sphere work.  See STEADY & TOURÉ, supra note 36, at 77 (noting
that women make economically valuable contributions through unpaid domestic sphere labor).
44. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 39, at 983-85 (characterizing “public” issues as more likely to
be included in treaties, legislation, and other national and international law instruments);
Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 626 (claiming that more importance is given to men’s public
sphere work than is given to women’s private sphere activities); M. Patricia Fernandez Kelly,
Underclass and Immigrant Women as Economic Actors:  Rethinking Citizenship in a Changing Global
Economy, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 151, 164-65 (1993) (describing men’s status as tied to their
public sphere economic and political activity); Wright, supra note 37, at 868 (stating that public
sphere work, generally performed by men, has become “privileged” in economic analyses).
45. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 39, at 984 (claiming that private sphere issues are either
overlooked or de-emphasized in national and international legal regimes); Charlesworth, supra
note 20, at 626 (explaining that “women’s” work in the private realm is valued less than “men’s”
work in public realm); Wright, supra note 37, at 868-69 (describing feminist efforts to gain
recognition for value of women’s work).
46. See Abbott, supra note 39, at 985 (stating that women perform unpaid labor at home
and in their communities); see also ENLOE, supra note 20, at 72 (describing the dependence of
U.S. military bases on the unpaid household labor of male soldiers’ wives).
the separate roles of women and men persists despite the fact that, in
some sectors of Mexico, more than half the women are single and do
not have access to traditional heterosexual relationships in which
men financially support women who stay at home.47
The expectation that women will remain in the home has limited
Mexican women’s ability to participate in national and international
decision-making processes in several ways.48  First, Mexican culture
pressures women to refrain from working in the public sphere by
dictating that women’s proper area of activity is at home, not in
public.49  Second, logistical constraints reinforce the pressure to stay
at home because, historically, Mexican women’s domestic sphere
responsibilities have consumed their time and made it difficult for
them to engage in independent economic activity.50  Third, Mexican
women who want or need to work have frequently had more difficulty
than men in finding employment in the “public” sphere.51  The jobs
that Mexican women are able to obtain are often low-wage52 and exist
in areas of economic activity that draw little public recognition.53
This combination of social and economic pressures has operated to
discourage many Mexican housewives from entering the public
                                                       
47. See AUGUSTA DWYER, ON THE LINE:  LIFE ON THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER 28 (1994)
(discussing the time and economic pressures in the lives of maquiladora workers); Durand,
supra note 11, at 131 (estimating that between 69% and 81% of female maquiladora workers are
unmarried).
48. See Wright, supra note 37, at 862 (finding that public-private structures throughout the
world present difficulties for women who try to enter the public sphere).
49. See GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER, supra note 42, at 288 (explaining that many Mexican
husbands do not permit their wives to work outside of the home or otherwise participate in
public sphere activities); Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (stating that, according to the Mexican
ideal of womanhood, proper women are housewives and mothers).
50. See GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER, supra note 42, at 290 (characterizing housework
responsibilities as a major obstacle to women’s ability to engage in paid employment); Mona
Zulficar, From Human Rights to Program Reality:  Vienna, Cairo, and Beijing in Perspective, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1017, 1034 (1995) (describing women’s domestic chores as an impediment to
participation in “more productive” activities).  Because of men’s greater access to paid labor
and women’s time-consuming responsibilities at home, women historically have been financially
dependent on men.  See Wright, supra note 37, at 867.
51. See GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER, supra note 42, at 277.  Mexican employers are sometimes
more inclined to choose a man over a woman because of the perception that men are the
primary income-earners for families, and therefore are in more urgent need of paying jobs.  See
id.  This assumption, however, conflicts with the reality that a substantial number of Mexican
households depend entirely on women for financial support.  See RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL
FACTORY:  ANALYSIS AND ACTION FOR A NEW ECONOMIC ERA 11 (1990) (describing Mexican
women who are sole income-earners in the family); cf. LOURDES BENERÍA & MARTHA ROLDÁN,
THE CROSSROADS OF CLASS & GENDER:  INDUSTRIAL HOUSEWORK, SUBCONTRACTING, AND
HOUSEHOLD DYNAMICS IN MEXICO CITY 49 (1987) (quoting a female executive who said that, in
recent years, “the taboo of not employing married women has practically disappeared”).
52. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 46 (noting that Mexican women who work outside home
tend to cluster in low paid positions).
53. See Abbott, supra note 39, at 985 (characterizing women’s private sphere work as lower
status work that receives little formal acknowledgment).
sphere altogether.  Female workers are generally confined to low
visibility jobs that offer few opportunities for articulating women’s
concerns in a male-dominated public forum such as international
law.54
The public-private dichotomy and the gender-based discrimination
that accompanies it also present hardships for Mexican women who
have been able to gain visible, prestigious employment and
discourages them from using their positions to address the concerns
of women.55  High-ranking women may receive opprobrium for
violating cultural norms governing the proper scope of women’s
activities.56  Male co-workers and superiors, believing that women do
not belong in the workplace, may impede women’s opportunities for
professional advancement by discounting their opinions,57 engaging
in sexual harassment,58 or questioning their competence.59  Women
may also feel compelled to conform to male-defined norms, leaving
unchallenged the traditional male-defined priorities of the
organization in order to gain acceptance from their largely male
peers.60  These barriers have contributed to minimizing the number
                                                       
54. See Kelly, supra note 44, at 164-65 (characterizing women as excluded from civil society
because they historically have not been economically or politically visible).
55. See Laurens Grant, Machismo in Mexico:  How a Hostile Workplace Ruins Many Women’s
Careers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 9, 1995, at B1 (reporting that many Mexican female
executives feel that the corporate environment is hostile toward women and their concerns).
Women in professional positions in international organizations, such as the United Nations,
frequently face the same difficulties as Mexican women operating at high-ranking national
levels regarding conflicts between their professional responsibilities and their expected role in
the home.  See STEADY & TOURÉ, supra note 36, at 54 (describing the need to make working
conditions in the U.N. system more responsive to the needs of workers with families); Knop,
supra note 37, at 304-05 (pointing out that women who are diplomats may be constricted in
their choice of assignments due to the resistance of extremely patriarchal societies that do not
accept women working at official, high-ranking levels).
56. See Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (stating that Mexican women who work for money
are often subject to accusations of being promiscuous); Grant, supra note 55, at B1 (reporting
that a female executive attributed the lack of women in high positions to cultural disapproval of
women with careers).  In other countries, too, women may not be hired as readily for high level
jobs because of a perception that women are tied to their family responsibilities and will be less
capable in their professional duties than men.  See ENLOE, supra note 20, at 114-20 (describing
the rationale for the pre-1971 U.S. policy of not hiring married women for diplomatic
positions).
57. See Knop, supra note 37, at 305 (noting that negotiating styles of female diplomats may
be different from traditional styles of male diplomats, and may cause women’s proposals to
receive less consideration).
58. See Grant, supra note 55, at B1 (describing Mexican female professionals’ experiences
of sexual harassment and characterizing Mexican corporate culture as “laden” with sexual
harassment against female managers).
59. See id. (citing the experience of female professionals in Mexico who complained about
discriminatory working conditions and subsequently were dismissed by their companies on the
grounds of poor performance).
60. See ENLOE, supra note 20, at 6-7 (giving examples of women who have gained major
international roles and have adopted “masculinized” political behavior).
of women in the Mexican government61 and may have resulted in
fewer situations in which women have had the opportunity to
participate in international negotiations undertaken by the Mexican
government, such as those for the NAFTA and the NAALC.62  The
absence of potential advocates for women permits national
representatives to pay less attention to the needs and concerns of
women when they create international law and policy.63
                                                       
61. See INSTITUTO DE LA MUJER ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN WOMEN 162-64 (1995) (reporting
that women’s participation in the Mexican government comprised 11.8% of the Senate and
13.8% of the Chamber of Deputies in 1994, and 17.6% of the cabinet positions in 1995).
62. See Knop, supra note 37, at 303 (noting women’s low participation in international
negotiations by national governments).  Another way women are excluded from the procedures
that create international law and policy is through flaws in the attitudes and hiring procedures
of international bodies, such as the United Nations, which perpetuate the invisibility of women
in decision-making processes.  See Dallmeyer, supra note 40, at 6 (characterizing U.N. hiring
policies toward women as “appalling”); ENLOE, supra note 20, at 120 (pointing out the lack of
women in senior decision-making positions at the World Bank and the International American
Development Bank); STEADY & TOURÉ, supra note 36, at 137 (questioning why U.N. hiring goals
for women in upper level positions have been ineffective even though Article 8 of U.N. Charter
mandates equal treatment in the hiring and promoting of men and women).  One reason for
the exclusion of women from positions in international organizations may be due to the
organizations’ memberships.  See Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 622 (characterizing
international organizations as “extensions” of member nations).  Because the memberships of
these organizations are composed of sovereign nations, the attitudes toward women that are
embedded in their hiring and employment processes tend to reflect the attitudes of their
member states.  See id.
Under one theory of employment selection and discrimination, the fact that few women
number among the international representatives of their countries does not constitute
“underrepresentation” as long as procedural equal employment opportunity exists.  See Knop,
supra note 37, at 303.  If women are not present in national diplomatic delegations under these
conditions, it is considered to be a result of self-selection and free choice.  See id. (describing
argument of “[c]lassical liberal theorists”).  Feminists counter this argument by pointing to
subjective factors that inhibit the desire of women to work in male-dominated fields, such as
international law, where male-defined norms of behavior govern individual and institutional
conduct.  See id. at 304.
63. See Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 625 (characterizing “all” important international law
institutions as male-dominated and discussing results of women’s absence from such
institutions).
When women are not represented in the leadership of international organizations for the
reasons previously discussed, the priorities, activities, and policies of these groups are less likely
to include women’s needs and concerns.  See, e.g., id. (explaining that when men control the
creation of international law, they do not prioritize issues particular to women, such as domestic
and sexual violence, because men do not see these problems as universal human concerns that
merit regulation under international law); Karen L. Engle, Views From the Margins:  A Response to
David Kennedy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 105, 116 (1994) (examining the argument that international
law fails to protect women by not directly addressing their concerns); Wright, supra note 37, at
872 (characterizing the feminist perspective on international law as an approach that
incorporates women’s concerns into public sphere discourse); see also STEADY & TOURÉ, supra
note 36, at 4 (highlighting the potential of female managers to raise awareness about gender
issues throughout the U.N. system).
One of the negative consequences of international decision-making processes that exclude
women is that when primarily male negotiation teams or policy-making groups use the concepts
of “human” and “person,” they tend to assume that the individual being described is male.  See
Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 637 (showing how the use of “his rights” or “rights of man”
language in international law ignores women’s experiences); Wright, supra note 37, at 873
(criticizing language in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
B. The Effects of Legislative Procedures on Negotiations
Another reason that the NAFTA and the NAALC did not
adequately include the concerns of female maquiladora workers was
due to the problems inherent in the negotiation process.  First, the
parties to the NAALC drafted and enacted it in a short period of
time, about six months,64 which raises questions about the quality and
quantity of governmental and public debate that accompanied its
negotiations.  Had the NAALC negotiators extended the drafting
process over a longer period, women and labor activists from the U.S.
and Mexico may have had a better opportunity to articulate their
concerns and advocate on behalf of maquiladora workers.
Second, the Bush and Clinton administrations enjoyed what is
known as “fast track” negotiating authority,65 through which the U.S.
                                                       
that excludes women’s concerns).
Another argument for the inclusion of women in international law negotiations posits that
women may not necessarily make better or different decisions than the men who historically
have occupied the primary positions in international decision-making, but women should be in
a position to make and affect decisions that will ultimately affect women.  See Knop, supra note
37, at 306-07 (describing the theory known as the “collective autonomy” response).  The results
of not having adequate female representation in national delegations and international
organizations can be seen in the body of international law and policy that currently exists.  See
Wright, supra note 37, at 881.  An example of the ways in which women’s concerns are
overlooked in international decision-making can be found in the economic development
strategies for poor countries that international organizations have promoted during the past
four decades, which frequently have excluded the perspective of women.  See id. (asserting that
the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) historically have not
acknowledged that women play a role in the economic development processes of poor and
nonindustrialized countries).  Because the contributions that women make to the family occur
primarily in the “invisible” private sphere, development policy-makers frequently assume that
women will be able to continue their private sphere activities at unchanged levels no matter
what economic obstacles they face, because these policy-makers do not recognize the effort
required for women to make these contributions.  See id. at 881-82 (reporting World Bank and
IMF assumptions that poor women will somehow be able to compensate for social service
cutbacks in food assistance and medical care); see also STEADY & TOURÉ, supra note 36, at 77
(suggesting that the International Labor Organization should change its current policies and
begin to account for women’s unpaid domestic sphere labor when it compiles national
economic data).  As a result, the burdens of economic development policies such as the IMF
“structural adjustment programs,” which cut social services like medical care and increase the
prices of essential items, tend to fall heaviest on women, who then have fewer resources to meet
unchanged demands.  See Abbott, supra note 39, at 985 (describing unemployment and
environmental degradation as structural adjustment results that cause problems for women);
Wright, supra note 37, at 882 (describing the effect of reduced social services on women).
64. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125.  The impetus for creating the NAALC came from
President Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign, during which he supported the idea of
hemispheric free trade as long as the agreement protected workers and the environment.  See
id. at 124-25.  Clinton took office in January 1993, NAALC negotiations began late in the spring
of 1993, and the parties signed the final package, including the NAFTA and the NAALC, in
September 1993.  See id. at 125.
65. See id. at 122 (describing President Bush’s efforts in 1991 to renew fast track authority
for the NAFTA).  President Bush was permitted to make a request to extend fast track authority
under the original fast track enabling legislation.  See id. (citing Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1989)).
Canada and Mexico had different approaches to domestic approval of the NAFTA.  The
Congress agrees to vote up or down on international trade
agreements that the executive branch negotiates, without
amendment.  It is a grant of power that Congress gives to the
executive for limited periods of time in return for notice
requirements to affected congressional committees.66  Congress
granted the fast track power under which NAFTA and NAALC
negotiations proceeded in 1988, and President Bush renewed this
power in 1991.67  Thus, Congress limited itself to approval or
disapproval of the entire NAFTA accord, including the NAALC.68
Congress renewed fast track authority for the NAFTA in 1991
because it enabled the executive branch to assure Canada and
Mexico that Congress would not alter the terms for the NAFTA that
the three nations had negotiated.69  Congressional approval of the
1991 renewal for the NAFTA was conditioned, however, on Bush’s
commitment to provide some type of labor protection in the
resulting free trade agreement.70  Many felt that the NAFTA that Bush
presented in 1992 did not meet these requirements, which led to
vocal opposition against the agreement in Congress and during the
                                                       
agreement passed in Mexico under constrained terms of legislative consideration that were
similar to U.S. fast track.  See Fast Track Authority and North American Free Trade Agreement:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev. of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 102d
Cong. 37 (1991) (statement of Rep. Kaptur) (arguing against the passage of the NAFTA
because the Mexican legislature was not permitted to discuss or consider a proposed treaty).
Canada’s trade negotiators, working within the Canadian federal system, worked with the
provinces during the NAFTA (including the NAALC) negotiations because many of the
agreement’s provisions must be implemented directly by provincial governments.  See Matthew
Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between Free Trade and Federalism:  Revisiting
the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 441, 483 (1997) (discussing Canadian negotiating
procedures).  One negotiator, representing the federal government and working with
provincial governors, represented Canada during the trilateral negotiations.  See id. at 483-84.
66. See Melissa Ann Miller, Will the Circle be Unbroken?  Chile’s Accession to the NAFTA and the
Fast-Track Debate, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 153, 160 (1996) (describing the fast track process).  Fast
track authority expired in 1993 and has not been renewed as of this writing.  See Charles Tiefer,
“Alongside” the Fast Track:  Environmental and Labor Issues in the FTAA, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
329, 329 (1998) (discussing the Clinton Administration’s failure to achieve fast track renewal
legislation in Congress after expiration).
67. See Miller, supra note 66, at 161-62 (recounting congressional debate over fast track
renewal in 1991).
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d)-(e) (1994) (preventing Congress from amending fast track
legislation and prescribing time limits on floor consideration of such legislation); see also Kristen
R. Loecke, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and Its Implications for NAFTA:  Public
Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 603, 613-14 (1993) (stating that fast track allows the
President to write legislation and requires Congress to vote on submitted legislation within sixty
days).
69. See Abbott, supra note 39, at 993-94 (suggesting that fast track was developed to give the
executive branch unilateral authority in trade negotiations and to inspire confidence in trade
partners).
70. See Miller, supra note 66, at 164 (describing the Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution,
which required the executive branch to achieve certain objectives during NAFTA negotiations
including the establishment of assistance programs for dislocated workers).
1992 presidential election.71  During the campaign, then-governor
Clinton pledged to negotiate a supplemental labor accord that would
address the concerns of workers’ rights advocates who felt that the
NAFTA did not address their concerns.72  This led to the NAALC’s
negotiation after Clinton took office and its inclusion in the final
NAFTA agreement that Congress approved in late 1993.73  During the
negotiation of the NAALC, several members of Congress advocated
on behalf of workers, including female Mexican maquiladora
workers, contending that the trade agreement did not contain
adequate worker protections.74  Although the final NAFTA package
included the NAALC, the purpose of which was to protect workers’
rights,75 fast track may have hindered proponents’ ability to influence
the final provisions of either the NAFTA or the NAALC, and to make
them more responsive to workers’ concerns.76  Despite the efforts of
NAFTA opponents to defeat it, the agreement, including the NAALC,
ultimately was approved as proposed.77
II. PROVISIONS OF THE NAFTA AND THE NAALC THAT EXCLUDE
FEMALE WORKERS
A. The NAFTA
The final NAFTA and NAALC agreements fail to protect female
Mexican maquiladora workers in several ways.  A major flaw of the
NAFTA is its failure to recognize women’s labor within the domestic
sphere as a commodity that contributes to international trade.78
                                                       
71. See id. at 165 (describing the U.S. reaction to the NAFTA).
72. See id.
73. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125 n.29 (discussing the negotiations that led to the
approval of the NAFTA package).
74. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S16,602, S16,607 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Riegle) (highlighting the concerns for laborers in Mexico and United States under the
NAFTA); id. at S16,692 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Glenn) (discussing the
possible negative effects on U.S. and Mexican workers resulting from passage of the NAFTA);
Field Hearings on H.R. 3878, the American Jobs Protection Act, and on the Mexico Free Trade Agreement
and its Impact on American Jobs and the American Workplace:  Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 102d Cong. 195 (1992) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (criticizing the
living conditions of Mexican workers who live near U.S. maquiladoras); Abbott, supra note 39,
at 993-94 (highlighting Rep. Marcy Kaptur’s concern for Mexican maquiladora workers).
75. See NAALC, supra note 3, Preamble (outlining the agreement’s guiding principles).
76. See Economic Impact of the Mexico Free Trade Agreement:  Hearings Before the Task Force on
Econ. Pol’y, Projections, and Revenues of the House Budget Comm., 102d Cong. 38 (1991) (statement
of Rev. Blake, United Methodist Church and Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace) (opposing
fast track authority because it curtails full public participation in legislative process); Abbott,
supra note 39, at 996 (arguing that fast track procedures reduce abilities of nongovernmental
actors to affect proposed legislation).
77. See NAFTA, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
78. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 526 (criticizing the NAFTA and the NAALC for not
Every society requires individuals who care for children and maintain
home life,79 and in most cultures women provide the majority of this
labor, without remuneration.80  Their unpaid domestic labor frees
capital that would otherwise be invested in the national and
international economies.81  Despite the economic importance of
housework, its value is unrecognized in the NAFTA, which does not
regulate, influence pertinent policies, or otherwise attribute any
significance to housework or childcare.82  The absence of any such
regulation or policy reflects the attitude that domestic sphere labor,
or “women’s work,” is a “natural” function of women that does not
merit or require official recognition in international agreements.83
                                                       
protecting informal and domestic sphere workers); see also Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 641
(citing a 1967 report that women provide up to 80% of food production in developing
countries); Wright, supra note 37, at 861 (claiming that women perform a large percentage of
the world’s work in exchange for a small percentage of world’s resources).
79. See Wright, supra note 37, at 861-62 (describing the “private sphere” occupied by
women).
80. See STEADY & TOURÉ, supra note 36, at 77-78 (recognizing that the contributions women
make to national economic activity are often invisible because they take place in the home); see
also Barbieri, supra note 40, at 562 (reporting the need to decrease private sphere burdens on
women by increasing men’s participation in domestic labor).
81. See Wright, supra note 37, at 861-62 (finding that, on average, women work longer
hours than men for much less compensation).
82. See NAFTA, chs. 6, 7, 13, 14, 17, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1994)) (describing the goods and services covered by the
NAFTA including petrochemicals, intellectual property, telecommunications, agriculture and
financial services);  cf. George P. Choundas, Neither Equal nor Protected:  The Invisible Law of Equal
Protection, the Legal Invisibility of its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J. 1069, 1108-09 (1995)
(recounting the concept of “negative liberty,” which emphasizes the need to protect individual
freedom against the meddling of government intervention and regulation).
83. See HEVENER, supra note 37, at 2-3 (stating that nations historically have been unwilling
to recognize issues regarding women as subjects under international law jurisdiction).  The
actors who make international law frequently view issues associated with women and the
domestic sphere, such as food production, child care, relationships between family members,
and spousal violence, as activities between individuals that do not involve direct state action.  See
Dallmeyer, supra note 40, at 159.  Reflecting the public-private dichotomy as it exists in Mexico
and other societies, international decision-makers presume that international law governs the
behavior of states toward other nations and toward their own citizens.  See id.  International law,
under this analysis, has no jurisdiction over the direct actions of private individuals.  See Knop,
supra note 37, at 330.  Because private individuals perpetrate much of the violence and
discrimination against women, this paradigm significantly excludes women from the protection
of international law.  See Dallmeyer, supra note 40, at 159.
International trade organizations often exclude women from their agreements.  One reason
is that the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) has frequently failed to acknowledge the
specific concerns of women in its workers’ rights conventions and agreements.  See Lance
Compa, International Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for Working Women, 17 YALE J.
INT’L L. 156, 162 (1992).  It is crucial for women to have their concerns articulated by the ILO
because national and international trade provisions frequently adopt ILO standards when they
choose language for workers’ rights provisions.  See id. at 158 (describing U.S. trade law
provisions that refer to ILO definitions as prevailing workers’ rights standards).  When the ILO
excludes women from its list of priorities or does not treat their needs as legitimate subjects of
international law, the rest of the world frequently follows suit.  See id. at 161.  The ILO also
functions as a moral force on behalf of workers’ rights; therefore, if the ILO does not articulate
that women and their concerns are priorities, international trade actors will have little incentive
B. The NAALC
Although the NAFTA primarily addresses the exchange of goods
and services,84 the NAALC’s express purpose is to safeguard workers’
rights in Mexico, Canada and the United States.85  In addition to the
lack of concern for women’s issues displayed during the NAALC’s
development process, the NAALC’s substantive provisions and
grievance procedures also hamper female workers’ ability to gain
adequate redress for their concerns.
1. Description of the NAALC’s substance and procedures
The NAALC operates by defining eleven internationally-recognized
workers’ rights as areas of concern that signatory nations must
address.86  These rights include the freedom of association, the right
to bargain collectively, the right to strike, the right to be free from
forced labor, the prohibition of child labor, minimum employment
standards such as minimum wages, the prohibition of employment
discrimination, equal pay regardless of sex, the prevention of
occupational hazards, and the right to compensation in the case of
workplace-related injuries.87  The agreement, however, only binds the
three signatory nations to respect labor rights88 and, because it only
places obligations on the signatories, does not directly affect the
actions of private entities such as corporations.89  It instead relies on
each of the signatories to ensure that private parties within each
party’s borders comply with labor laws.90  The NAALC establishes two
methods for ensuring labor rights.  First, each signatory nation
pledges to maintain “high labor standards” and to protect the eleven
enumerated rights by ensuring that national legislation regulates
domestic working conditions and that this legislation is actually
                                                       
to do so.  See id.
84. See NAFTA, art. 102, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C. (1994)) (outlining the NAFTA’s objective to promote trade in goods and
services).
85. See NAALC, supra note 3, Preamble (affirming the parties’ obligations to promote
increased employment, higher living standards, and respect for labor laws in their countries).
86. See id. Annex 1 (enumerating protected rights).
The NAALC’s administrative organization is the Commission for Labor Cooperation, which
is composed of a Ministerial Council and a Secretariat.  See Murphy, supra note 1, at 409.  The
Ministerial Council consists of the cabinet members for labor from each signatory nation and
serves as the governing body, and the Secretariat is a bureaucratic organization that handles
day-to-day affairs.  See id.
87. See NAALC, supra note 3, Annex 1(1)-(10).
88. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125.
89. See id.
90. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 2 (requiring parties to guarantee that their domestic
labor laws ensure high standards).
enforced.91  Second, the NAALC establishes consultation and
enforcement procedures through which the signatory countries can
ensure that their partners respect the enumerated rights.92
The NAALC’s enforcement mechanisms operate primarily through
the actions of National Administrative Offices (“NAOs”).93  Each
signatory nation is obliged to establish its own NAO, which is the
primary body that enforces the NAALC within that nation.94  One way
that NAOs operate is by requesting that another NAO engage in
Cooperative Consultations, which are educational exchanges between
two signatory nations that concern either national labor law
provisions, labor law administration or labor market conditions in
one of the countries.95  NAOs also operate by investigating alleged
violations of any of the eleven enforceable labor rights in other
signatory nations, either on the NAO’s own initiative or in response
to petitions filed by outside organizations such as labor unions or
human rights groups.96
After an NAO accepts a petition from an outside group alleging
labor violations97 or initiates proceedings at its own behest, the NAO
investigates the allegations through public hearings and consultations
with the NAO of the country in which the alleged violation
occurred.98  If the investigation process demonstrates to the NAO that
the other signatory nation violated NAALC-protected labor rights, the
NAO can impose or recommend a course of corrective action.99  The
first level of corrective action involves Ministerial Consultations,
which may be utilized for violations of any of the eleven rights
                                                       
91. See id. arts. 2-3 (laying out obligations of the parties).
92. See id. arts. 20-41 (describing NAALC enforcement procedures).
93. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 126 (describing the role of NAOs).
94. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 15 (requiring the establishment of a federal-level NAO in
each signatory); Herzstein, supra note 11, at 127 (describing the role of an NAO).  The United
States established its NAO in December, 1993.  See North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation; Establishment of National Administrative Office, 58 Fed. Reg. 69410 (1993)
(announcing creation of U.S. NAO).
95. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 21; Herzstein, supra note 11, at 127 (describing the
cooperative consultation process).
96. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 126-28 (describing the procedures that are triggered by
complaints alleging specific violations of labor issues protected under the NAALC); Muniz,
supra note 33, at 392 (stating that NAOs may initiate investigations upon their own initiative).
97. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 410-11 (explaining that each NAO has broad discretion to
define its criteria for accepting or rejecting outside complaints and stating that the NAALC
gives NAOs jurisdiction to deal with any issue concerning “labor” law (citing Article 49 of the
NAALC)).
98. See id. at 411 (finding that NAOs investigate complaints according to nationally-
determined procedures).
99. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 126-30 (describing measures that NAOs can employ to
encourage observance of labor rights by other NAFTA parties).
included under the NAALC.100  Despite the fact that all eleven rights
are listed together in Annex 1, without any apparent distinction made
among them, consultations are the only corrective action available for
violations of three NAALC rights:  freedom of association, the right to
collective bargaining, and the right to strike.101  Once Ministerial
Consultations are exhausted, petitions regarding these three issues
have no additional recourse under NAALC procedures.102  If a
Ministerial Consultation does not resolve an issue concerning a
subject that is eligible for further action, an NAO’s next step is to
request an Evaluation Committee of Experts (“ECE”), which is
available for the remaining eight rights.103  The ECE procedure is the
highest corrective action available under the NAALC for five of the
eight ECE-eligible rights.104  If, however, the matter concerns health
and safety issues, child labor, or minimum wage violations and the
ECE process fails to produce results, the dispute can go to mediation
by the Council of Ministers105 and, if the Council of Ministers process
is not successful, to an arbitration panel.106  If the arbitration panel
determines that a nation has violated one of the three rights listed
above through a “persistent pattern of failure” to enforce relevant
labor laws, the panel will recommend an “action plan” that may
include sanctions, which are effectuated through increasing trade
                                                       
100. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 22; Muniz, supra note 33, at 391 (stating that the U.S.
Secretary of Labor, the Mexican Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare, and the Canadian
Minister of Human Resources Development head Ministerial Consultation matters and also
perform other oversight tasks under the NAALC’s procedures).
101. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 23(3)(a) (defining Evaluation Committee of Experts
(“ECEs”), the next level of enforcement, as available only to “trade-related” disputes);
Herzstein, supra note 11, at 128 (clarifying the eight trade-related matters that may advance to
ECE proceedings).
102. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 23(3)(a).
103. See id. art. 23 (establishing procedures for ECEs); Herzstein, supra note 11, at 126, 128
(stating that ECEs are made up of neutral parties from all three signatory nations).  ECEs may
be utilized in cases concerning forced labor, child labor, minimum employment standards,
employment discrimination, equal pay for men and women, occupational safety and health,
worker’s compensation, and protection of migrant workers.  See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 127-
29.  ECEs are not available in cases involving freedom of association, collective bargaining, or
the right to strike.  See id.  Matters that ECEs review must involve trade issues and must be
addressed by “mutually-recognized” labor laws in the two disagreeing signatory nations.  See id.
at 129.  Both Ministerial Consultations and ECEs are intended to consist of non-adversarial,
cooperative activity between signatory nations.  See id.
104. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 27(1) (defining the next level of enforcement procedures
as restricted to matters involving health and safety issues, child labor, or minimum wage
violations).
105. See id. art. 28; Herzstein, supra note 11, at 128-29.
106. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 29; Murphy, supra note 1, at 412 (stating that arbitration
panels are composed of five experts selected from the Commission for Labor Cooperation
roster).  The NAALC establishes rules for Arbitration Panel procedures and conduct.  See
NAALC, supra note 3, arts. 30-39.
tariffs against the offending nation.107  Only arbitral panels may
impose sanctions.108  Panels may also impose non-monetary penalties,
which the NAALC leaves open to the suggestions of panels and
disputing parties.109
2. Substantive provisions of the NAALC that detrimentally affect female
maquiladora workers
The NAALC’s substantive provisions detrimentally affect female
Mexican maquiladora workers by failing to establish as protected
workers’ rights many issues that especially affect women.  In fact,
several concerns that affect female workers in particular are
completely omitted from the NAALC.  For example, the agreement
fails to include as an enumerated right parental leave for both
mothers and fathers for family emergencies and childbirth,110 access
to affordable childcare,111 and assurance of fair representation and
treatment of women in unions.112  Although most working women
view some or all of these provisions as essential to their ability to work
outside the home,113 the absence of these issues in the NAALC
indicates that negotiators did not regard these women’s concerns as
important.114  The NAALC also does not explicitly prohibit sexual
harassment.115
The NAALC specifically addresses women’s issues in two of the
eleven enumerated rights:  first, it mandates equal pay for equal work
regardless of gender,116 and second, it prohibits employment
discrimination based on sex.117  The only remedies available for
violations of these two rights, however, are Ministerial Consultations
                                                       
107. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 39(1), (4).  Sanctions may only be used in cases involving
occupational safety and health, child labor, and minimum wage, and only when the offending
trade partner has displayed a persistent pattern of misconduct, failed to implement a
committee-designed action plan, and refused to pay a penalty.  See id. art. 39; see also Muniz,
supra note 33, at 391 (criticizing the NAALC for not applying sanctions to violations of seven
other labor rights).  Sanctions of up to $20,000,000 consist of either fines or enactment of pre-
NAFTA trade tariffs.  See id. at 392-93.
108. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 39(4)(b) (outlining the decision-making process
associated with implementing sanctions).
109. See id. art. 39(4)(a) (stating that panels may adopt action plans that parties propose if
they are capable of addressing non-enforcement problems).
110. See id. Annex 1 (explaining the principles that the NAALC promotes).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See ENLOE, supra note 20, at 178 (describing the various tactics that working women use
to provide supervision for their children).
114. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 555 (relating the efforts by labor activists to create more
gender awareness in the NAALC).
115. See NAALC, supra note 3, Annex 1 (listing the rights protected by the agreement).
116. See id.
117. See id.
and ECE enforcement, but not sanctions.118  This enforcement
scheme suggests that the signatory nations to the NAALC do not view
prevention of sex discrimination as a top priority.
A final problem with the substantive provisions of the NAALC is
that they do not establish uniform standards of treatment for workers
across all three nations.119  Rather, the eleven enumerated rights
establish labor protections that the national laws of each signatory
must include to some extent and which the signatories must
“effectively” enforce.120  As noted, the NAALC is unusual among
international labor protection agreements because the threat of
monetary sanctions against parties that are persistent violators of
certain labor rights gives it more enforcement power.121  The specific
level and quality of workers’ rights within each country, however, is
dependent on the individual country’s national laws.122
This approach is problematic for Mexican women because,
although Mexican law nominally guarantees equality of treatment
between the sexes,123 Mexican law does not adequately address either
                                                       
118. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (describing the types of sanctions
applicable to violations of the rights protected by the NAALC); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S HUMAN
RIGHTS 281 (1995) (noting the lack of more serious enforcement mechanisms for gender issues
under the NAALC); see also Herzstein, supra note 11, at 128.
119. See, e.g., Compa, supra note 1, at 134 (describing the NAALC’s reliance on national
legislation as an attempt to protect national sovereignty, tempered by international oversight);
Herzstein, supra note 11, at 125-26 (stating that the NAALC does not require signatories to
adhere to identical labor standards); Muniz, supra note 33, at 393 (characterizing the NAALC’s
labor standards as contingent on national legislation, not “tri-national” principles).
120. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 408 (suggesting that “effective” enforcement of national
labor laws includes effective inspection and monitoring programs and noting that the NAALC
operates by placing moral pressure on signatory nations to comply with the spirit of worker
protections).
121. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 39 (explaining sanction procedures).
122. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 407-08 (stating that the NAFTA does not force signatory
parties to establish identical labor standards).
123. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS tit. I, art. 4 (Mex.),
cited in Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Two Legal Constructs of Motherhood:  “Protective” Legislation in
Mexico and the United States, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 239, 243 (1992) (stating that
Article 4 of Mexican Constitution requires that women and men receive equal treatment under
law).
In addition to its national equality laws, Mexico is also party to several international
agreements that condemn sex discrimination. See Submission Concerning Pregnancy-Based Sex
Discrimination in Mexico’s Maquiladora Sector to the United States National Administrative Office 7, 20-
21 (May 15, 1997) (renamed U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Communication #9701)
[hereinafter Public Communication #9701] (submitted by Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights
Project, Human Rights Watch/Americas, International Labor Rights Fund, and Asociación
Nacional de Abogados Democráticos).  These include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and ILO Convention 111 on
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.  See id. at 22-24.  The Mexican
Constitution defines international treaties that Mexico has ratified as part of national law, so the
provisions of these treaties are considered national legislation under the NAALC.  See id. at 20-
21.
gender discrimination or many other aspects of women’s
experiences.124  For example, Mexican legislation fails to address
issues related to home-based production work or work done in the
informal sphere,125 which are prominent areas of women’s
employment in Mexico.126  Mexican law also does not adequately
address sexual harassment in the workplace.127
Furthermore, some Mexican laws are detrimental because they
treat women in a paternalistic, protective manner128 or base legal
                                                       
124. See Lopez, supra note 123, at 240 (describing the fact that, although Mexican law
ostensibly treats women as equals, it is administered according to social constructs that treat
women only as wives and mothers and fails to incorporate fully the entire range of women’s
experiences).  International law excludes women from participation and representation in its
negotiations through the same public-private dichotomy that operates on the national level.  See
Knop, supra note 37, at 330 (arguing that international law assigns private sphere concerns to
regulation of national governments instead of dealing with them through international law
instruments).  This perspective parallels national governments’ assignment of women’s private
sphere concerns to informal family structures, rather than addressing them through formal
legal mechanisms.  See id.
125. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 527, 559 (finding that Mexican labor laws do not protect
women who work at home); infra notes 196-213 (explaining informal sphere).
126. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 529 (reporting that informal sector is an important
source of employment for Latin American women).
127. See Codigo Penal Para el Distrito Federal [Penal Code for the Federal District] arts.
259-62 (Porrora ed., 1995), cited in Gaby Ore-Aguilar, Sexual Harassment and Human Rights in
Latin America, 66 FORDAM L. REV. 631, 634-35 n.27-30 (1997) (detailing Mexican criminal laws
that forbid sexual harassment as a “crime against liberty and normal psychosexual
development”).  The law threatens the perpetrator with punishment only when the victim can
show harm as a result of the harassment.  See id.; Susan Kostal, A Sexual Harassment Lawsuit Tests
the Reach of American Labor Law Under the U.S.-Mexican Trade Pact, CALIFORNIA LAW., Aug. 1995, at
41 (explaining that Mexican law provides no civil recourse for, and only ineffective criminal
prohibitions against, workplace sexual harassment).
128. See Durand, supra note 11, at 130 (citing Mexican labor law that prohibits maquiladora
management from using most female employees, but permits the employment of male
employees, in dangerous work); Lopez, supra note 123, at 247 (analyzing Mexican legislation
that concerns women as a reflection of the social construct that views the husband as the family
head and the wife as his dependent).
International law that regulates women is, like national legislation, frequently based on
assumptions about women’s limited capabilities and their primary role as caretakers of the
family and home.  See HEVENER, supra note 37, at 4, 6 (describing international law as
“protective” of women in their roles as wives and mothers and stating that such laws
communicate messages about women’s status as an inferior group).  Under this paradigm,
international law adopts stereotypical national and cultural views that women’s primary role
should be that of mother.  See id. at 6-7.
Even the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”),
whose entire purpose is to support equality for women and nondescription based on sex, G.A.
Res. 34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), may create problems by
“ghettoizing” women’s concerns in a specific document.  See Dallmeyer, supra note 40, at 6-7.
CEDAW is a significant achievement for women in many ways because it is an important
international instrument that focuses exclusively on women’s concerns, ensuring that they are
not overshadowed by other topics within the agreement.  See Arden B. Levy, International
Prosecution of Rape in Warfare:  Nondiscriminatory Recognition and Enforcement, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 255, 281 (1994) (discussing the potentially positive aspects of CEDAW that may help to
promote women’s rights more effectively).  The existence of a special “women’s” international
legal instrument, however, may cause problems for women by providing justification for not
including women’s specific concerns in other pieces of international law, under the theory that
consideration for women solely on their roles as mothers.129  Instead
of promoting gender equity, these laws reinforce traditional ideas
about women’s proper role as homemakers and mothers who should
not work in the public sphere.130  For example, the Mexican federal
                                                       
women’s issues have already been codified and need no further attention.  See Dallmeyer, supra
note 40, at 6.  The implementation and enforcement mechanisms embodied in this convention
also tend to be weak, which prevents effective enforcement of the rights codified therein.  See
Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 632-33 (criticizing CEDAW’s implementation mechanism as
weaker than those of other international human rights documents because its liberal
reservations policy allows states to ratify the treaty selectively).
It should be noted, however, that some pieces of international law have addressed this
problem by incorporating women’s concerns into their provisions, calling for corrective
measures to remedy sex discrimination, and stressing gender equality within the context of
broader issues.  See HEVENER, supra note 37, at 12-13 (describing conventions that seek to create
an atmosphere in which both women and men have full opportunity to participate in all areas
of society).  Examples of non-discriminatory conventions include:  The Declaration on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (1952); the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991, 702 (1992); and the Charter of the United
Nations, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).  The inclusion of women’s perspectives into these international
agreements is a positive sign that gender-based perspectives have gained more recognition
within international law.  See Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 614 (describing the insertion of
women’s views into international agreements).  The preceding agreements that include
women’s perspectives, however, all concern the area of human rights, which specifically deals
with the rights of individuals.  See id.  Other areas of international law, such as those that deal
with sovereignty, the duties of states, the use of force and territorial rights, continue to be
unreceptive to suggestions that they should acknowledge their effects on individuals, including
women.  See id.
129. See Lopez, supra note 123, at 240 (characterizing some Mexican legislation as an effort
to bolster women’s traditional role as mothers).
Another example of protective, stereotypical laws exists in the United States, where some
employers have tried to use workplace “fetal protection policies” to exclude fertile women from
certain jobs involving hazardous conditions.  See id. at 250-53.  These company rules purport to
ensure that the fetuses of pregnant women are not exposed to harmful substances during the
course of the woman’s employment.  See id. at 250.  Employers, however, have used these
protection policies discriminatorily against women by exclusively targeting female employees,
despite the proven health effects that workplace chemicals can have on the male reproductive
system and resulting detriments to fetal health.  See id.  For example, employers have used these
regulations to discriminate against women when hiring for “dangerous” positions by excluding
women altogether, and to fire women currently working in those positions and replace them
with male workers.  See id. at 251.  Like the Mexican maternity leave laws, these regulations have
a doubly negative effect for women because they reinforce the assumption that all women who
could become pregnant will or wish to become pregnant, thus making it more difficult for
women to find employment.  See id. at 247, 251-52.  Although the mentality of these regulations
may still exist in unofficial hiring and employment policies of U.S. employers, the Supreme
Court ruled that explicit fetal protection policies illegally discriminate against women under
Title VII.  See id. (citing International Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991)).
130. See Ley Federal de Trabajo, tit. V, art. 170, paras. III-VII, cited in Lopez, supra note 123,
at 240 (describing Mexican labor laws that assume women will choose the traditional role of
wife and mother by regulating women’s employment based on potential dangers to unborn
children).
labor code mandates a generous maternity policy for female
employees, including full pay for six weeks before and after the birth
and payment of fifty percent of the employee’s wages for two months
after the birth of a child, which employers must partially subsidize.131
New mothers also have the option of taking up to one year of unpaid
leave after the birth and are assured of their previous employment
positions upon their return to work.132  In many ways, these seem to
be progressive labor laws.133  By making parental leave exclusively
available to women and not to men, however, the laws lend official
support to the idea that only men should work outside the home and
that women’s primary responsibility is to become mothers and stay at
home with their children.134
Mexican maternity leave provisions also negatively affect female job
applicants.  Although Mexican law forbids workplace discrimination
against female employees who are pregnant,135 it does not require
employers to treat a female job applicant equally in hiring decisions if
the employer fears that she will become pregnant and require
subsidized maternity leave.136  In order to ensure that female job
applicants are not pregnant when they hire them, some maquiladora
                                                       
131. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, tit. VII, art. 123, cited
in Lopez, supra note 123, at 246-47.
Although Mexican law mandates that employers provide pregnant employees with benefits,
these laws are rarely enforced in the maquiladora sector.  See Public Communication #9701, supra
note 123, at 27-29 (highlighting difficulties that pregnant maquiladora workers face).  Pregnant
women working in maquiladoras are routinely either fired outright or are demoted and denied
health and leave benefits in order to pressure them to resign, so that maquiladora owners can
avoid paying the costs of maternity leave.  See id.
U.S. and Canadian leave laws, in contrast to Mexican laws, encourage both parents to
participate in childrearing by making parental leave available to both fathers and mothers.  See
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (1995) (defining “eligible employee” as any
employee who meets certain length of work requirements); id. § 2612(a) (entitling eligible
employees in the United States to family-related leave from work for reasons that include the
birth, adoption, or illness of a child); An Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act, S.C.
1990, c. 40, §§ 9, 14, cited in Susan B. Boyd, Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide?  Women,
Work, and Family, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE 161, 170 n.50 (1996) (making Canadian
parental leave provisions available to both men and women).
132. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, tit. VII, art. 123, cited
in Lopez, supra note 123, at 246 (describing the Mexican maternity leave law).
133. See Lopez, supra note 123, at 247 (describing the positive reactions by Mexicans to
national maternity leave laws).
134. See id. (explaining that not all Mexican female workers want to have children and that
not all those with children wish to utilize maternity leave procedures).
135. See id. at 245-46 (reporting that equal wages are required for equal work under the
Mexican constitution and labor laws).
136. See id. at 244, 247 (stating that no laws forbid hiring discrimination against working
women).  Maternity leave provisions are costly to employers in direct outlays and lost
productivity.  See id. at 245-46 (explaining that employers must subsidize part of the wages that
women receive during maternity leave and must hire and train temporary workers to fill the
new mothers’ positions temporarily).
operators require women to provide negative pregnancy tests,137
describe their menstrual cycles138 and undergo physical
examinations.139  This type of pregnancy-based discrimination violates
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the
International Labor Organization’s Convention 111, which are all
international treaties that Mexico has ratified to prohibit sex
discrimination.140  By permitting hiring discrimination on the basis of
potential pregnancy, Mexican labor laws further contribute to an
atmosphere that discourages women from working outside the home,
and instead promotes the traditional gender roles of wife and
mother.141
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE NAFTA AND THE NAALC ON FEMALE
MAQUILADORA WORKERS
Although the NAFTA and the NAALC are now five years old, their
effects on female workers in Mexican maquiladoras is still
materializing.  On one hand, the experiences of women who work in
maquiladoras have changed little since 1994 because the Border
Industrialization Program of 1964 and successive programs, all with
terms of trade similar to the NAFTA’s, have been in place for many
years and have contributed to the establishment of employment
patterns and labor conditions in maquiladoras throughout Mexico.142
The NAFTA’s reduction of trade barriers, therefore, has had a less
dramatic impact on the wages and working conditions of the
maquiladora sector than in other areas that the agreement has
                                                       
137. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No.
#9701, at 36-38 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Jan. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Public Report #9701] (on file with American University Law Review) (describing




140. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO GUARANTEES, supra note 34, at 30-31 (outlining the
international legal sources of protection for female maquiladora workers).
141. See Lopez, supra note 123, at 247-48 (finding that, by imposing costs on employers,
Mexican maternity leave laws discourage employers from hiring women who may become
pregnant and thus encourage a traditional family structure in which women stay at home).
142. See Peters, supra note 24, at 229-30 (describing the establishment of BIP and successive
modifications by Mexican and U.S. governments); Durand, supra note 11, at 128 (arguing that
maquiladoras were in operation for over thirty years prior to passage of the NAFTA and did not
experience many changes as a result of the trade agreement); Gregory, supra note 5, at 538-39
(claiming that the NAFTA will encourage the well-established trend toward increased
international trade that began in 1970s).
affected.143  On the other hand, the economic growth in Mexico that
has resulted from the expansion of international trade under the
NAFTA144 has affected female workers in one important way because
of the continually rising number of women that are now working in
maquiladoras.145  Although the NAFTA may not have significantly
affected the immediate conditions confronting women beyond
providing increased maquiladora employment opportunities, the
impressive number of women who work in factories stand to be
affected by the NAALC.146  Although only the equal pay for equal
work and employment discrimination provisions explicitly mention
women,147 the NAALC offers women a new avenue for airing
grievances and gaining relief from abusive employer or governmental
practices in the workplace.148  But because it neither recognizes many
women’s concerns nor enforces relevant provisions with sanctions,149
the NAALC does not go far enough.
A. Women in Maquiladoras Since the NAFTA’s Passage
Many Mexican women have had the opportunity150 to work outside
the home and to earn income due to the maquiladoras that have
proliferated under the NAFTA.151  The ability to earn money and
                                                       
143. See Durand, supra note 11, at 128.
144. See ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE ET AL, STUDY ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF THE
NAFTA 26 (1997) (attributing Mexico’s fast recovery from the 1994 currency devaluation and
increased levels of economic growth to the expanded NAFTA-linked international trade).
145. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 559 (stating that the employment of women will rise in
Mexican maquiladora and tourism sectors, which have expanded under the NAFTA).
146. See Travis, supra note 5, at 192-93 (speculating that gender-neutral workers’ rights
protections in the NAALC offer potential avenues of recourse to female workers in
maquiladoras).
147. See NAALC, supra note 3, Annex 1.
148. See Travis, supra note 5, at 192-93.
149. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (describing which NAALC provisions are
enforceable through sanctions).
150. See Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (estimating that 75% of maquiladora workers are
women).
151. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11 (emphasizing that many women are the sole income
earner in their families and maquiladora work is a ready source of employment); WOMEN ON
THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER:  RESPONSES TO CHANGE 78 (Vicki L. Ruiz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter RESPONSES TO CHANGE] (noting that factory work integrates women into formal
economic structures and teaches them skills).
Despite the argument that employment provides women with useful skills, one criticism of
maquiladora production methods is that they employ “deskilling” techniques.  See GRUNWALD &
FLAMM, supra note 24, at 169.  This method breaks down complicated tasks into their simplest
procedural components which require very few skills beyond those like sewing, which workers
often already possess as the result of having learned them at home.  See id.  Because they
typically perform the least technical tasks that require the least amount of training, workers do
not gain useful skills that they can later use to enhance their value in the labor market.  See id.
Women are frequently not even trained in additional skills that would make them more
productive, such as how to fix machinery.  See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 48
(describing managers’ unwillingness to teach women technical skills that would enable them to
support themselves is empowering for women because it frees them
from their traditional financial dependence on men.152  Remunerated
employment is necessary for women, especially single mothers, whose
families require their financial contribution.153  Paid jobs also allow
women to escape from the most extreme conditions of poverty.154
Finally, the fact that large numbers of women work in the paid,
“public sphere” maquiladora sector promotes social recognition of
women as economic actors155 and increases women’s confidence in
their ability to act in the public sphere.156
Despite these positive gains, the experience of women working in
Mexican maquiladora factories has been problematic, both before
and since the NAFTA’s passage, especially because these problems
now affect more women than ever before due to the expansion of
maquiladoras.157  First, maquiladora work in Mexico continues to
reflect the societal norms of patriarchy and male control over women
that exist in Mexican culture.158  This is evident in the gendered
                                                       
perform simple repairs on assembly line machinery because they prefer to keep female workers
unskilled and concentrate technical knowledge in the hands of higher-ranking male
employees).
152. See, e.g., BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 148 (relating Mexican female workers’
views about having their own money and the independence that money gives them from their
husbands); GRUNWALD, supra note 24, at 167 (noting that women whose first jobs are in
maquiladoras value the independence they gain); RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 78
(explaining that maquiladora employment provides alternatives to early marriage and
motherhood); Peters, supra note 24, at 243 (explaining that many Mexican women have always
worked out of economic necessity, but maquiladoras have provided employment opportunities
that do not usually exist for women in formal employment sectors).
153. See GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER, supra note 42, at 291 (highlighting that, in Mexico, single
mothers of small children have a special need to work to provide for their families because their
children are not old enough to work and supplement family income).
154. See GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at 167 (noting that some female maquiladora
workers have gained higher standards of living for themselves and their families).
155. See Kelly, supra note 44, at 164-65 (describing the growing social acceptance of women
as economic producers who act in public sphere).
156. See RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 78 (hypothesizing that public sphere
employment bolsters women’s self-esteem and increases awareness of “personal autonomy”).
157. See Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (noting the increasing number of female
maquiladora workers).
158. See, e.g., BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 52 (quoting a maquiladora executive who
stated that women are assumed to be psychologically dependent and that women know that
they are unfit for workplace advancement); Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (explaining that  the
atmosphere of maquiladoras is designed to exploit women’s fears about being seen as
promiscuous by people who do not approve of female employment); KAMEL, supra note 51, at
41 (describing one factory’s strategy of controlling female workers by hanging lollipops over
workers’ heads.  The lollipop’s color indicated the quality of each worker’s output:  “green for
good, blue for poor, orange for very poor”); RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 78-80
(claiming that factories operated by transnational corporations aggressively exploit women’s
vulnerable economic and social position by emphasizing stereotypical feminine traits such as
domesticity and physical attractiveness through company activities like cooking classes and
beauty pageants); Heidi Tinsman, Behind the Sexual Division of Labor:  Connecting Sex to Capitalist
Production, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 247 (1992) (arguing that the “social reality of male sexual
dominance” controls gendered division of labor in the economic marketplace).
division of labor that exists in Mexican factories,159 where men occupy
the majority of supervisory and leadership positions,160 and women
generally work in jobs that receive lower wages,161 engender less
respect,162 and exist in poorer working conditions.163  Additionally,
factory employers may justify not hiring women for higher paid
management or technical positions because they assume that women
are secondary earners whose wages merely supplement those of a
male member of the household.164  Sexual harassment, consisting of
offensive or sexually coercive behavior by male supervisors toward
female employees,165 is also a frequent problem in maquiladoras.166
                                                       
Researchers have studied the exploitation of gender roles in maquiladoras along the Mexico-
U.S. border.  See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11.  In some maquiladora factories, small numbers of
male workers were placed on formerly all-women production lines in order to pressure the
female workers to behave more submissively.  See id.  Maquiladora managers apparently believed
that, in order to quell female workers’ complaints, they could employ pre-existing social
pressures that encourage women to defer to men.  See id.  It is not clear if this tactic has
succeeded.  See id.
159. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 41 (explaining that male dominance of maquiladora
management structures impedes female workers’ opportunities for advancement); see also
GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER, supra note 42, at 80 (describing the gendered division of labor in the
Colombian cut-flower industry where men occupy most management and maintenance
positions, and women most frequently work in areas “directly related to the flower”).
160. See, e.g., Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (describing how maquiladora positions are
filled according to race and sex, with Anglo males universally in higher status positions and
Mexican women universally in lower status positions); KAMEL, supra note 51, at 41 (explaining
that when maquiladora factories need technical workers, recruiters seek male personnel from
outside the factory rather than training female production line workers for advancement);
RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 139-40 (noting that although the majority of first-line
supervisors are males who have been promoted from technical positions within a company or
recruited from outside the company, women rarely attain positions at this rank or higher
ranks).  Another aspect of the “deskilling” strategy in maquiladoras, see supra note 151, is that
women are not generally promoted to higher positions where they can learn skills like
management techniques.  See GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at 169.
161. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 46 (finding that women may receive lower pay
than men for identical maquiladora work and that women are concentrated in the lowest-paid
factory positions); ENLOE, supra note 20, at 162 (describing the method for lowering women’s
wages in comparison to men’s wages by defining certain tasks, namely sewing, as unskilled,
paying workers in those positions less, and assigning women to those positions).
162. See Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (finding that the maquiladora workplace is
structured so women fill those positions with the least amount of authority and influence).
163. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 44 (reporting that female maquiladora
workers typically perform tasks that take place in physically confining and crowded areas and
that male workers tend to work on projects in more spacious and less cramped conditions).
164. See id. at 52 (quoting a maquiladora executive who claimed that women in his factory
are paid less because women’s wages are used for individual expenses, whereas men are
required to spend their wages on family expenses); KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11.  This
“corporate mythology” works to keep women in lower paid, lower status positions despite the
fact that women are frequently the only income earner in their households.  See id.  Further, the
wages of maquiladora production line workers, the majority of whom are women, do not always
cover the costs of supporting a family.  See id. at 41.
165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998) (describing the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission’s
(“EEOC”) guidelines regarding sexual harassment under Title VII).  The EEOC has
promulgated one definition of sexual harassment.  See id.  This includes “unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”
Id.  These conditions constitute actionable sexual harassment when the behavior is an implicit
Despite Mexican society’s traditional aversion to hiring women for
paid labor, many maquiladora owners prefer female workers for
assembly-line work.167  Although Mexican women benefit from the
increased employment opportunities that this preference creates,168
maquiladora managers nonetheless reinforce harmful social and
cultural stereotypes when they select women for certain tasks based
on assumptions about the existence of particular skills or behaviors.169
For instance, managers assume that women possess greater manual
dexterity than men because they have smaller hands and “naturally”
perform intricate activities like sewing at home.170  Maquiladora
factories frequently employ women for work on small or delicate
assembly tasks, especially in electronics and sewing,171 because
                                                       
or explicit “term or condition” of a person’s work, is used as a “basis for employment decisions”
that affect the person, unreasonably interferes with the person’s work, or creates an
“intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”  Id.
166. See, e.g., Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (stating that maquiladora supervisors attempt
to control female workers with gender related pressures that include sexual harassment);
RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 110 (explaining that male maquiladora supervisors
assume power over young female employees in ways that parallel the traditional authority of
fathers, but supervisors may use their “paternal” authority to gain sexual access to female
workers); Nauman & Hutchison, supra note 36, at 953 (finding that one egregious form of
sexual harassment occurs when male supervisors rape female maquiladora workers).
167. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 43-44 (noting the growing levels of female
employment in production facilities of all sizes); RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 108
(citing statistics that indicate that female employees result in higher profits for maquiladoras);
see also Donald D. Stull, Of Meat and (Wo)Men:  Meatpacking’s Consequences for Communities, 3-SPG
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 112, 114 (1994) (reporting that U.S. meatpacking factories prefer
women because managers report that they are more in need of employment and consequently
willing to accept lower wages); Travis, supra note 5, at 190-91 (estimating that more than 2.25
million women work in export-processing zones throughout the world in maquiladora-like
factories and that women represent a large percentage of all such workers).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 150-56 (outlining the benefits of maquiladora
employment for women).
169. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 45 (citing feminist observations that women’s
paid work in factories typically centers around tasks similar to those that women perform as part
of household or childcare duties); KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11-12 (emphasizing that typical
factory tasks for women, such as sewing, are undervalued and defined as low-skill jobs,
regardless of the dexterity and knowledge actually required, because the skills are learned at
home).
Maquiladora managers in Mexico also hire female workers because they know that
government and union leaders pay more attention to the working conditions of male workers.
See Peters, supra note 24, at 244.  By using primarily female workers, whose concerns are often
not seen as priorities by labor advocates, factories can pay lower wages and provide poorer
working conditions because they are unlikely to be pressured to improve their treatment of
workers.  See id.
170. See GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at 167 (citing maquiladora managers who
prefer women for intricate electronic circuitry work); KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11 (stating that
managers view women as “innately suited” for delicate assembly work in electronics and
garments).
171. See GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at 168 (noting that, throughout the world,
women’s familiarity with dexterous work like sewing is the result of socialization processes at
home, and that dexterous skills acquired at home serve as an effective foundation for learning
intricate electronic and garment assembly skills).
supervisors assume that women will do more accurate work and cause
less harm to the product than men.172  Studies show, however, that
men working in delicate assembly tasks are as efficient as women,173
which indicates that managers’ preference for women is based on
traditional stereotypes about women.174
Another gender characteristic that encourages factory decision-
makers to choose women for maquiladora work is the perception,
reinforced by experience,175 that women are more docile than male
workers176 and are less prone to engage in union organizing.177
Managers value compliant workers who do not complain about poor
working conditions178 because their silence saves factory authorities
from having to deal with troublesome, pro-union employees who
demand higher wages179 and expensive improvements in the areas of
safety and health.180
The perception that women complain less and are involved in
fewer union activities actually has some basis in fact, although it is not
caused by any inherent sex characteristic.181  The first reason for this
                                                       
172. See id. at 167 (noting that maquiladora managers frequently mention women’s
dexterity as an explanation for why they prefer female assembly workers).
173. See id. (citing reports by factory supervisors in Mexico).
174. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 50 (noting that not all women possess gender-
associated skills like sewing).
175. See id. (describing socialization processes that encourage woman to be submissive).
176. See GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at 167 (relating maquiladora managers’ beliefs
that women are more accustomed to “routine” tasks and therefore more patient with them);
KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11 (explaining that women are perceived as more capable of enduring
boring and “monotonous” maquiladora assembly tasks); cf. RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note
151, at 124-25 (cautioning that generalizations about female maquiladora workers’ docility do
not sufficiently account for women’s efforts to resist corporate exploitation and organize for
better working conditions).
177. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11 (stating that maquiladora managers believe that women
are less prone to rebellion and labor activism than men); cf. RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note
151, at 124-25 (pointing out that women have taken action to organize on behalf of labor rights
in maquiladoras, contrary to maquiladora managers’ assumptions about female workers’
passivity).
178. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 41 (“We like to hire girls who don’t have too much
experience because they aren’t spoiled. . . .  Then you can trust they won’t fly off the handle,
making unrealistic demands or joining unions.”) (quoting maquiladora supervisor in Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico).  Factory managers and the Mexican government oppose union organizing by
both female and male maquiladora workers because it raises labor costs and is seen as a
hindrance to foreign investment.  See Peters, supra note 24, at 247 (characterizing foreign
corporations’ opposition to union activities in Mexico as well-organized and effective).
179. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 41; see also GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER, supra note 42, at 305
(indicating that, in Brazil, substituting male factory workers with women enabled employers to
lower labor costs).
180. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 49 (describing employers who prefer female
employees because they make fewer complaints about their working environment).
181. See, e.g., id. at 50 (describing the characteristic of submissiveness, as associated with
women, as result of gendered socialization processes); GRUNWALD & FLAMM, supra note 24, at
168 (theorizing that men are culturally encouraged to be impatient with intricate, repetitious
tasks); KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11 (describing docility as a survival mechanism employed by
is that Mexican women who are able to obtain employment outside
the private sphere frequently do not engage in union activity182
because they must still perform their duties at home.183  After
performing this “double shift” of housework and paid labor, women,
including female maquiladora workers, have little time or energy to
participate in extraneous activities and, therefore, often decline
union participation and the benefits therein.184  Second, Mexican
women may be less inclined to participate in organized labor
movements because of the risks involved for the well-being of their
families, especially their children.185  Women who are the primary
income-earners for their households, such as single mothers and
women whose husbands do not contribute financially to the family,
often feel that they cannot afford to anger their employers and risk
losing their jobs by joining a union.186  Although women may actually
be less vocal about maquiladora conditions in practice187 and factory
preferences for women create more opportunities for women in
certain types of work,188 managers’ reliance on “docile” stereotypes
hurts women because it provides justification for managerial
decisions that place women in menial, unpleasant, low-paid work.189
The increasing rate of employment of large numbers of women in
maquiladoras, under the NAFTA190 has also raised concerns outside
the factory walls.  For example, increased female employment in the
expanded maquiladora sector has caused disproportionately high
rates of birth defects, such as anencephaly,191 in children born to
female maquiladora workers.192  Medical and environmental
                                                       
women to avoid conflict with male supervisors, which women discard when they are no longer
at work).
182. See Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (reporting that few Mexican female workers are
unionized).
183. See RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 84 (noting that female maquiladora
workers must perform both factory duties and household-related work).
184. See id. (commenting on the double workday of many female maquiladora workers and
its fatiguing effects).
185. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 11 (stating that Mexican families are often dependent on
women’s income for survival).
186. See Cynthia Enloe, The Globetrotting Sneaker, MS., Mar./Apr. 1995, at 13.
187. See Nauman & Hutchison, supra note 36, at 953 (reporting that female maquiladora
workers fear that they will lose their jobs if they “rock[] the boat” by complaining about
workplace conditions).
188. See RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 108 (discussing preference for female
workers).
189. See Dagenais, supra note 41, at 331 (discussing the generally low status of women’s
maquiladora jobs).
190. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 559 (stating that women’s maquiladora employment will
rise under the NAFTA).
191. See DWYER, supra note 47, at 52-53 (describing anencephaly as a fatal neural tube
disorder in which the fetal brain either develops only partially or does not develop at all).
192. See, e.g., id. at 53 (citing medical findings showing that anencephaly rates in
authorities attribute these high rates of birth defects to two causes:
(1) maquiladora factories have introduced industrial pollutants into
the air, water, and soil of the communities where they are located,193
and (2) maquiladora work frequently exposes female workers to
potentially harmful chemicals.194  This contact frequently occurs when
women handle chemicals without adequate safety training or health
protections, such as gloves, goggles or proper ventilation.195
The growing prominence of informal, in-home production is
another social issue that may be associated with women and increased
maquiladora employment under the NAFTA.196  Increased industrial
production in Mexico under the NAFTA may cause a corresponding
growth in this area of activity because factory producers often
subcontract out low technology, labor-intensive segments of their
production and assembly processes to informal producers.197  They do
so in an effort to lower costs and raise profits.198  Informal production
                                                       
Brownsville, Texas are three to five times higher than the national average); Bacon, supra note
18, at 573 (reporting that six anencephalitic children were born in 1993 and thirteen were born
in 1994 in a maquiladora community near Tijuana); Juanita Darling, Environment, A River of
Doubt:  The Rio Grande’s Pollution is Part of the Debate, L.A., Aug. 31, 1993, at 2 (describing a Texas
lawsuit which families of children with birth defects brought against maquiladora factories in
Matamoros, Mexico).
One famous incident regarding maquiladora-related birth defects concerned a Mallory
Capacitors maquiladora in Matamoros, Mexico.  See DWYER, supra note 47, at 66-68; Durand,
supra note 11, at 131.  Factory managers required pregnant women to put their hands into
containers of highly toxic PCB chemicals and provided only rubber gloves for protection.  See id.
at 66-68.  About 100 children born from these women throughout the 1970s and 1980s
displayed similar unique characteristics:  broad noses, thin lips, webbed digits, and mental
handicaps ranging from mild to severe.  See DWYER, supra note 47, at 66.  Doctors investigating
the cluster of birth defects found that the single unifying factor among the children was their
mothers’ employment at Mallory.  See id.  The case today is referred to as the “Mallory
Children.”  See id.
193. See DWYER, supra note 47, at 53 (citing the medical opinion that high anencephaly rates
along the Texas-Mexican border were due to environmental factors because most mothers did
not display other risk factors); Loecke, supra note 68, at 605 (blaming maquiladora pollution
for birth defects in Mexican-U.S. border area); see also Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (noting
that one chemical leak from a maquiladora forced community residents to destroy possessions
and livestock).
194. See Durand, supra note 11, at 131 (reporting the exposure of pregnant women to PCB
chemicals while they worked in maquiladora factories).
195. See id. (reporting that Mallory Capacitors workers had only rubber gloves for protection
while placing their hands in vats of PCB chemicals).
196. See Kelly, supra note 44, at 162-63 (describing patterns of in-home production, often
referred to as the “informal sphere,” that maquiladoras producing electronics in Southern
California use).  The informal assembly sector usually consists of small scale, unregulated, labor
intensive activities that take place in workers’ homes or in small workshops.  See GEOGRAPHY OF
GENDER, supra note 42, at 282.  Generally, informal sector workers receive assignments and
materials directly from a factory or from an intermediate “jobber.”  See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN,
supra note 51, at 59; see also KAMEL, supra note 51, at 17 (characterizing the informal industry as
way for producers, especially in garment industry, to avoid labor standards).
197. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 59 (characterizing the nature of typical
informal sector work).
198. See id. at 64-65; Kelly, supra note 44, at 163 (reporting that the benefits of informal
is cheaper due to lower overhead costs199 and less government
regulation of informal facilities.200  The fact that informal sector
workers are generally quite poor and therefore, willing to accept very
low wages201 and poor working conditions is another reason for lower
costs in this sector.202
The informal sector has historically been an important source of
paid employment for Mexican women,203 and women continue to play
a prominent role in this sector despite high levels of female
employment in maquiladoras.204  Informal work offers several benefits
to women.  First, because maquiladora managers consider older
women and women with children to be less desirable workers, such
women often work informally because they typically have fewer
factory job opportunities.205  Informal work is therefore, an important
area of employment for these groups of women.206  Second, working
informally at home provides women with more flexibility by enabling
them to engage in paid activities and while simultaneously caring for
their children.207  This reduces childcare problems and allows women
to spend more time with their children.208  Although it allows women
to earn needed income,209 informal sector employment in individual
homes or in small microproduction facilities with few other workers is
problematic because, as discussed, labor practices become more
                                                       
production to manufacturers include lower costs and increased flexibility to market demands).
199. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 59 (stating that twenty-five percent of tasks
performed in informal sector require no tools, and most other tasks require only very simple
devices like knives).
200. See KAMEL, supra note 51, at 17 (describing informal production facilities as
unregulated alternatives to formal sector factories, which are susceptible to government
monitoring).
201. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 62 (finding that informal workers received
wages that varied over a wide range and generally were far below Mexican minimum wages).
202. See id. at 61 (stating that informal workers must often transport materials themselves to
their homes, despite not having private transportation).  Managers also use arbitrary standards
for determining quality of finished work and assess penalties for damaged materials.  See id.
203. See id. at 65 (stating that the majority of informal workers are female); Barbieri, supra
note 40, at 559 (reporting that Mexican women make up a large percentage of the informal
sector workers).
204. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 559 (citing areas of informal work that have expanded
due to increased industrial investment in Mexico).
205. See RESPONSES TO CHANGE, supra note 151, at 84 (citing maquiladora managers who
prefer young, childless female employees because they are unfamiliar with labor unions and are
more productive because they have fewer family responsibilities).
206. See id.
207. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 150; Barbieri, supra note 40, at 529 (reporting
that informal sector work allows women to arrange their work schedule in response to childcare
demands).
208. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 529.
209. See BENERÍA & ROLDÁN, supra note 51, at 150 (discussing female informal workers’ need
for the income they generate).
difficult to monitor.210  This frequently results in unreasonably long
hours, unsafe conditions, and substandard pay.211  This type of work
also physically isolates women from other workers212 and creates
difficulties for women who wish to improve their working conditions
by participating in organized labor activities.213
B. U.S. National Administrative Office Cases
1. Gender-neutral cases
As of this writing, labor unions and human rights groups have filed
several petitions concerning labor practices in Mexican maquiladoras
with the U.S. NAO,214 of which five decisions have been issued.215
None of the NAOs has initiated proceedings on its own initiative;216 all
the proceedings have begun at the initiative of outside party
                                                       
210. See id. (stating that women who work in the informal sector are vulnerable to
exploitation because formal sector protections are not available to them).
211. See id. at 54 (identifying informal production conditions as “precarious” and stating
that informal sector wages can drop far below minimum legal levels).
212. See id. (finding that female informal workers who work at home lack political clout
because they are isolated from each other and thus are unable to form organizations to lobby
on their own behalf).
213. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 529 (characterizing informal workers as lacking formal
workplace protections, including labor union representation).  Labor unions often restrict
membership to workers in certain sectors of the economy, and informal and domestic sphere
labor is often not included.  See id. at 538.  Because informal sphere workers are primarily
women, these policies disproportionately exclude women.  See id.
214. See, e.g., U.S. National Administrative Office, Report on Ministerial Consultations on
Submission #94003 Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, at 1 (Bureau of
International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, June 4, 1996) [hereinafter Ministerial
Consultations #94003] (providing the results of Ministerial Consultations with Mexico) (on file
with the American University Law Review); Public Communication #9701, supra note 123, at 4; Lance
Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases:  A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-
MEX. L.J. 159, 174 (1995) (analyzing the first U.S. NAO submissions).
215. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #94001
and NAO Submission #94002 at 30-31 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Oct. 12, 1994) [hereinafter Public Report #94001 and #94002] (reporting NAO findings);
U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #94003, at 24-31
(Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, April 11, 1995) [hereinafter Public
Report #94003] (reporting NAO findings); Public Report #9701, supra note 137, at 43-46
(reporting NAO findings); U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of Review, NAO
Submission #9702, at 20-22 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, April 28,
1998) [hereinafter Public Report #9702] (reporting NAO findings); U.S. National Administrative
Office, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #9702-Part II:  Safety and Health Addendum, at 20-22
(Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, August 11, 1998) [hereinafter
Public Report #9702(II)] (reporting NAO findings); U.S. National Administrative Office, Public
Report of Review, NAO Submission #9703, at 71-72 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of Labor, July 31, 1998, revised August 21, 1998) [hereinafter Public Report #9703]
(reporting NAO findings) (on file with American University Law Review).
216. See U.S. National Advisory Committee, Report of the United States National Advisory
Committee Reviewing the First Four Years of Operation of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation 27 (April 15, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. National Advisory Committee] (on file with the
American University Law Review) (evaluating the NAALC’s operation and effectiveness).
submissions.  Although only one of the completed cases addressed a
topic specifically related to women, the others are relevant to the
NAALC’s effect on female workers because the decisions affect the
large number of women working in maquiladora factories, including
their ability to participate in and benefit from union membership217
as well as gain adequate health and safety protection in the
workplace.218  The gender neutral maquiladora cases that the U.S.
NAO has decided are also noteworthy because they demonstrate the
NAO’s growing level of knowledge and concern about union
conditions in Mexico.219  A maquiladora-related petition that
concerned pregnancy discrimination is the only petition to address
explicitly an issue concerning female workers.220
A number of the maquiladora-related petitions examined alleged
violations of maquiladora workers’ freedom of association by Mexican
affiliates of U.S. companies.221  The first case decided by the U.S. NAO
involved workers in maquiladoras that make parts for General
Electric (“GE”) and Honeywell corporations.222  According to the
petitions filed by U.S. labor unions with the U.S. NAO,223 maquiladora
management illegally fired workers for attempting to organize and
join independent factory unions.224  The U.S. NAO found that factory
operators had offered severance pay to the dismissed workers in
accordance with Mexican labor law,225 and concluded that the
workers’ acceptance of the pay precluded a finding that Mexico had
                                                       
217. See Public Report #94001 and #94002, supra note 215, at 9-13 (discussing alleged abuses
against the right to organize collectively); Public Report #94003, supra note 215, at 3; Public Report
#9702, supra note 215, at 20-22.
218. See Public Report #9702(II), supra note 215, at 42-43 (questioning whether Mexican
workplace health and safety inspection procedures adequately protected workers in a Han
Young assembly plant).
219. See Public Report #9702, supra note 215, at 16 (referring to the U.S. NAO’s decision in its
Public Report on Submission #94003).  This trend was demonstrated in a recent case,
concerning alleged freedom of association violations in a Hyundai supplier’s maquiladora,
where the U.S. NAO made detailed reference to the fact that a previous submission had
complained of a similar union organizing obstacles.  See id. (recounting past complaints about
CAB procedures that the NAO had reviewed).
220. See Public Communication #9701, supra note 123, at 4.
221. See, e.g., Public Report #94001 and #94002, supra note 215, at 9-13 (discussing freedom of
association rights in Honeywell and General Electric maquiladoras); Public Report #94003, supra
note 215, at 3 (regarding Sony maquiladora); Public Report #9703, supra note 215, at 2 (involving
Echlin affiliate maquiladora).
222. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 415 (describing the first complaints registered under
NAALC grievance procedures, which complainants filed on February 14, 1994).
223. See NAFTA’S FIRST YEAR:  LESSONS FOR THE HEMISPHERE 15 (Sarah Anderson & John
Cavanagh eds., 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA FIRST YEAR] (stating that Teamsters filed against
Honeywell’s plant and United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America filed against
General Electric’s (“GE”) plant).
224. See Compa, supra note 214, at 165-66.
225. See NAFTA’S FIRST YEAR, supra note 223, at 18 (describing the U.S. NAO’s reasoning in
the GE/Honeywell case).
failed to enforce its labor laws in violation of the NAALC.226  Despite a
finding of facial compliance with Mexican labor law, the U.S. NAO
nonetheless found that Mexican labor authorities had employed
questionable labor practices.227  This was especially true in the state-
dominated makeup of Mexico’s labor tribunals, the Arbitration and
Conciliation Boards (“CABs”),228 and procedural barriers that make it
difficult to establish independent unions.229  In order to address these
and related issues, the U.S. NAO suggested informal, bilateral
educational programs that would highlight the importance of
freedom of association rights.230  Despite its findings of possible
irregularities, the NAO refrained from making a formal finding that
Mexican authorities had failed to enforce their labor laws and also
declined to request further action, such as Ministerial
Consultations.231  Labor advocates viewed this outcome as
unsatisfactory, believing that the U.S. NAO did not critically examine
either the legality of the dismissals or the role of the Mexican
government in suppressing workers’ right to freedom of
association.232
The second U.S. NAO decision concerned workers’ freedom of
association rights in a maquiladora owned by a U.S. Sony affiliate.233
The labor unions and human rights groups that filed the petition234
                                                       
226. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 416-17 (noting that the U.S. NAO did not address whether
GE or Honeywell violated Mexican law because the focus of NAO inquiries is on the behavior of
the signatory government).
227. See Compa, supra note 214, at 175-76 (citing U.S. National Administrative Office, Public
Report of Review, NAO Submission #94001 and NAO Submission #94002, at 29 (Bureau of
International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Oct. 12, 1994)).
228. See id. (quoting the U.S. NAO); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 417 (describing
criticisms of the U.S. NAO’s assessment of the Mexican government’s preferential treatment of
official unions).  CABs are Mexican labor tribunals that handle allegations of labor violations.
See Compa, supra note 214, at 172.
229. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 417 (relating the U.S. NAO’s description of barriers to
recognition by independent unions and harassment of union organizers).  To function
officially and obtain the power to sign and enforce contracts, all Mexican unions must apply to
and register with the Mexican Labor Secretariat.  See Muniz, supra note 33, at 386.  Mexican
labor officials routinely deny independent unions’ efforts to register solely on the basis of
management objections, without proper investigation, or on the basis of petty mistakes in
written application materials.  See id. at 386 (describing the rejection of an independent union’s
attempt to register because of a misplaced comma in the registration document).
230. See Compa, supra note 214, at 176 (describing the outcome of the GE/Honeywell case).
231. See JEROME LEVINSON, NAFTA’S LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT:  LESSONS FROM THE FIRST
THREE YEARS 18 (1996) (discussing the shortcomings of the NAO’s decision).
232. See NAFTA’S FIRST YEAR, supra note 223, at 17 (criticizing the U.S. NAO’s finding that,
because dismissed workers had unimpeded access to Mexican legal remedies, there was no
violation of their rights).
233. See LEVINSON, supra note 231, at 1 (describing the background of the Sony case).
234. See Ministerial Consultations #94003, supra note 214, at 1 (listing the filing parties as the
International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, the Asociación Nacional de
Abogados Democráticos, the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, and the American
Friends Service Committee).
alleged, as in the General Electric/Honeywell case, that maquiladora
officials fired and intimidated employees attempting to organize an
independent union.235  The petitioners alleged that plant officials
interfered with a union election236 and enlisted the help of Mexican
police forces to suppress violently a work stoppage and employee
demonstration.237  Unlike its findings in the GE/Honeywell case, the
U.S. NAO in this instance found that independent union organizers
faced procedural problems that were serious and significant enough
to warrant Ministerial Consultations.238  The U.S. NAO also expressed
concern about the allegations of violent conduct by Mexican police
authorities.239  The Mexican government agreed to the U.S. NAO’s
suggestion of Ministerial Consultations, which were then completed
in May 1996.240
In March 1996, U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, in response
to communications from the original submitters, directed the U.S.
NAO to continue to observe union registration activities in Mexico
even after the publication of Ministerial Consultation results.241  The
U.S. NAO released a follow-up report in response to this request in
December 1996, which included information about recent Mexican
Supreme Court cases and labor legislation.242
Another maquiladora case, although not specifically involving
women, also concerned the suppression of independent union
organizing efforts in a maquiladora.  This petition grew out of
activities in a Han Young car chassis assembly.243  Workers in the plant
attempted to organize an independent union, which they hoped
would represent them more effectively than had the government-
                                                       
235. See id. at 4-5 (finding that maquiladora management intimidated employee leaders
through demotions, threats of dismissal, and outright dismissal).
236. See id. at 5 (reporting that some employees did not receive notice of the election and
that voting was not conducted by secret ballot).
237. See id. (reporting that police actions injured several workers); Eyal Press, Mexico’s
Unionization Struggle, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 29, 1995, at 18 (finding that the
majority of the injured workers were women and that police used fire hoses and riot gear
against them).
238. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Follow-Up Report, Submission No. #94003, at 2
(Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Dec. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Follow-
Up #94003] (summarizing the U.S. NAO’s recommendations) (on file with American University
Law Review).
239. See Public Report #94003, supra note 215, at 29 (describing local news reports that
supported the employees’ allegations of police violence).
240. See Follow-Up #94003, supra note 238, at 2-3 (describing the completion of the
Ministerial Consultation implementation agreement and publication of connected documents
on May 10, 1996).
241. See id. at 3.
242. See id.
243. See Public Report #9702, supra note 215, at 3 (discussing the factual background of the
submission).  Han Young is a supplier for Hyundai Corporation.  See id.
affiliated union which formally represented the plant.244  The
independent union registered with the proper Mexican authorities
and won plant representation elections that established its
membership base at the factory.245  The local CAB labor tribunal
nullified the independent union’s election victory on technical
grounds, but the Mexican government intervened and convinced the
factory and union representatives to hold a new representation
election, which the independent union also won.246  The U.S. NAO
submission alleged that factory management was unwilling to
negotiate with the new union and continued to harass union workers,
and that the CAB had violated procedural guarantees.247
The U.S. NAO found that the CAB’s post-election hearing
procedures were transparent and thus did not violate NAALC
requirements for procedural access.248  The NAO also found,
however, that the laws regulating union representation elections were
inconsistent with the NAALC because they permitted CABs to apply
arbitrary and vague standards to unions applying for registration.249
In arriving at this conclusion, the NAO specifically referred to its
findings in the Sony case regarding procedural obstacles to union
organization in Mexico,250 which may indicate the development of
U.S. NAO jurisprudence.  Finally, the NAO acknowledged programs
that the Mexican government has undertaken in apparent
recognition of the shortcomings that exist in CAB procedures.251  The
NAO recommended holding Ministerial Consultations to explore
options for making CAB procedures more regular and objective.252
The U.S. NAO released additional Han Young findings in a
separate decision, which was the first U.S. NAO report to address
health and safety issues.253  The facts of these allegations grew out of
                                                       
244. See id. at 4-5 (referring to a PRI-affiliated union that purportedly represented Han
Young workers).
245. See id. at 6-8 (reporting that organizers complied with the complicated registration and
certification process required for establishing new unions).
246. See id. at 8-9 (reporting actions by the CABs).
247. See id. at 10.
248. See id. at 46.
249. See id. at 46-47.
250. See id. at 33-36 (referring to the Sony decision’s findings, including the difficulty of
gaining certification for independent unions, the pro-government membership of many CABs,
and the inconsistent application of Mexican labor laws by CABs).
251. See id. at 47 (mentioning activities by the Mexican federal government, including
recommendations for improving the operation of local-level CABs, such as the one at issue in
the Han Young case).
252. See id. at 21.
253. See Public Report #9702(II), supra note 215, at 1 (explaining that the U.S. NAO released
two separate decisions because it received an addendum to the Han Young original submission
several months after the original filing).
events in the same Han Young factory and focused on harmful work
conditions254 and the lack of safety procedures and devices.255  The
report also described Mexican workplace safety and health
inspections, reporting that Mexican authorities had inspected and
fined the Han Young factory several times for unsafe working
conditions.256  The U.S. NAO’s decision focused on the efficacy of the
Mexican government’s actions, finding that Mexico had taken steps
to improve work conditions throughout the country by passing new
laws.257  The NAO found, however, that although several inspection
reports of the Han Young plant were substantially in compliance with
Mexican labor laws and had detected many of the serious problems
in the plant of which workers had complained, other reports did not
adequately note the existence of safety hazards in the plant.258  In
addition, despite evidence of inspections and the imposition of fines,
it was unclear whether Mexican authorities had enforced the fines.
The NAO also noted that the factory failed to correct many serious
problems even after fines had been levied.259  According to the NAO,
these unsatisfactory results indicated that Mexican inspection and
enforcement procedures lacked effective deterrent value.260  As a
result, the U.S. NAO found that Ministerial Consultations, discussing
the final resolution of health and safety claims against the Han Young
plant and examining ongoing Mexican governmental efforts to
ensure the effectiveness of workplace health and safety laws, would
enhance efforts to implement the NAALC.261
The most recent U.S. NAO decision as of this writing resulted from
events that occurred at an Echlin subsidiary maquiladora.262  The
report noted that, similar to the Han Young case, workers at the plant
petitioned for a representation election in an attempt to supplant a
                                                       
254. See id. at 2-4, 26-32 (citing workers’ allegations that they suffered from respiratory and
hearing problems, broken bones from falling equipment that was not properly secured, and
burns).
255. See id. at 2-4, 29-33 (reporting workers’ testimony regarding the lack of safety
equipment for welders, which resulted in frequent burns, and insufficient ventilation
equipment).
256. See id. at 31-40 (describing questionable inspection procedures such as giving advance
notice before government inspections).
257. See id. at 42 (referring to the April 1997 passage of the Federal Regulation on Safety,
Health, and the Workplace).
258. See id. at 38.
259. See id. at 42 (reporting that Mexican authorities had levied $9400 in penalties against
Han Young but that it was unclear if the original fines were collected).
260. See id. (indicating the importance of fine enforcement against factories that violate
labor standards in order to regulate workplace conditions effectively).
261. See id. at 43 (describing proposed objectives of Ministerial Consultations).
262. See Public Report #9703, supra note 215, at 2 (noting that Echlin is a U.S. corporation
that makes and sells automobile components).
government-affiliated union with an independent union.263  Their
efforts met with management-sponsored intimidation264 and CAB
procedural impediments,265 which may have contributed to the
independent union’s defeat in the representation election.266  In
addition, plant management dismissed fifty workers for their support
of the new union before the election,267 and several workers who
attempted to distribute information outside another Echlin
subsidiary plant after the representation election were physically
attacked.268  Additional problems that the report addressed were
dangerous workplace conditions, including improper exposure to
asbestos, and the effectiveness of Mexican workplace safety and
health inspections, which had resulted in only approximately $200 in
fines for consistent and serious health and safety violations.269  The
U.S. NAO found that the Mexican authorities had not acted in a
manner consistent with the NAALC requirement to protect workers’
right to freedom of association or to ensure that the Echlin subsidiary
complied with health and safety laws.270  It based this decision on the
questionable decisions of the CAB, which included the failure to
censure improper management conduct, the failure of Mexican
authorities to intervene on behalf of the workers who were attacked
                                                       
263. See id. at 4 (noting that workers were aware that a PRI-affiliated union existed but did
not possess information about the collective bargaining agreement).
264. See id. at 5-7 (reporting that about 170 “armed thugs” appeared at the factory on the
day of the representation election for the new union and that workers were forced to use open
ballots, which allowed management personnel to observe and record how they voted).
265. See id. (discussing the CAB’s decision to postpone the scheduled election date by more
than a week and its subsequent failure to inform representatives of the independent union
about the rescheduled date).  The CAB in question also did not notify union representatives
about a hearing it held to review the election outcome and examine claims of improper
management activities.  See id.
266. See id. at 6 (highlighting that the final election tally was 179 for the PRI-affiliated union
and 29 for the independent union).
267. See id. (noting that twenty-two workers sought reinstatement from a federal CAB and
the rest chose to accept the company’s offer of severance pay).  Management dismissed the
workers based on an “exclusion clause” in their contracts, which allowed the official union at
the factory, affiliated with the PRI, to expel workers from the union, and thus, from their jobs,
for violating union by-laws.  See id. at 43.  The Mexican Supreme Court has held that a union’s
invocation of the exclusion clause based on the way a member votes in a representation
election, may be considered an impermissible “reprisal” against the worker’s exercise of a
constitutional right.  See id. at 44 (citing Amparo Indirecto 2609/87, Sindicato Nacional Independiente
de Trabajadores de la Industria Automotriz, Similares, y Conexos, 15 agosto de 1988, Semanario
Judicial de la Federación, Octaba Epoca, Tomo II, Primera Parte, julio-diciembre de 1988, at
277).  This decision is not binding, but the U.S. NAO treated it as instructive about what may
qualify as an inappropriate use of the exclusion clause.  See id.
268. See id. at 46-47 (characterizing the violence at the other plant as an “ancillary, but
relevant, issue” because of its implications that government authorities may fail to ensure
workers’ right to engage in lawful public informational activities).
269. See id. at 4 (alleging that workers were required to work with toxic substances without
proper protection and in poorly ventilated areas).
270. See id. at 71.
while distributing information, and the imposition of minimal fines
for health and safety violations.271  As a result, the NAO
recommended Ministerial Consultations to examine:  management
activity during the election, the dismissal of the fifty workers, methods
of redress for complaints against CABs, health and safety issues in the
plant, and the effectiveness of health and safety enforcement
measures.272
These four cases, although not dealing specifically with women’s
issues, are significant to female maquiladora workers because they
highlight the importance of freedom of association in maquiladoras
and focus attention on maquiladora health and safety issues.  These
are problems of general concern that affect all maquiladora workers,
including the many women who work in such factories.  These
submissions appear to have caught the attention of the U.S. NAO,
which responded with particular concern in the Sony, Han Young,
and Echlin cases by recommending Ministerial Consultations,273 the
next available step of the NAALC enforcement procedures.  This
indicates that the U.S. NAO is at least willing to employ the next
available level of NAALC enforcement, and is doing so on a regular
basis.  Hopefully, these and similar cases will continue to focus
attention on freedom of association and health and safety concerns,
leading to greater public concern and increased willingness by
Mexican authorities and maquiladora management to improve
working conditions.
One problem with the NAALC that may hinder workers’ ability to
gain effective relief, however, is that Ministerial Consultations are the
highest level of review available for the allegations of freedom of
association violations.274  If more stringent measures were available
against Mexico for the violation of these rights, including sanctions,
problems with CABs, management intimidation, and violence against
workers might be addressed more rigorously.
In contrast, the NAALC provides additional recourse beyond
Ministerial Consultations for health and safety violations.  These
include ECEs275 and sanctions, which are available for a “persistent
                                                       
271. See id. (citing concerns about various aspects of the union organizing effort).
272. See id. at 71-72 (suggesting goals of the proposed Consultations).
273. See Public Report #9702, supra note 215, at 48 (recommending Ministerial Consultations
in the Han Young case); Public Report #94003, supra note 215, at 32 (recommending Ministerial
Consultations in the Sony case); Public Report #9703, supra note 215, at 72 (recommending
Ministerial Consultations in the Echlin case).
274. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 22 (establishing Ministerial Consultations as the final
remedy available under the NAALC for freedom of association violations).
275. See id. art. 23 (discussing the establishment of ECEs).
pattern of failure” to enforce related health and safety laws.276  The
fact that the U.S. NAO has accepted two health and safety
submissions and determined that further review is appropriate277
indicates that it is, at the very least, willing to address problems in this
area.  It remains to be seen if the NAO will be willing to pursue
additional levels of enforcement, such as ECE review or penalties, if
Mexican authorities do not adequately address the U.S. NAO’s
concerns in this area.
2. The pregnancy discrimination case
In addition to the previous cases. which addressed the impact of
labor rights violations from a gender-neutral point of view, a recent
U.S. NAO public report of review addressed maquiladora hiring and
employment practices that discriminate against female workers on
the basis of pregnancy.278  Unlike the other maquiladora-related
submissions, this case explicitly raised the issue of sex-based
employment discrimination.279  The submission alleged that, in order
to avoid government-mandated maternity leave costs,280 maquiladora
managers required female applicants and employees to take
pregnancy tests, submit to physical exams, and answer questions
about their sexual activity, menstrual schedules, and use of birth
control.281  The petition further stated that maquiladora managers
refuse to hire pregnant applicants and attempt to coerce female
employees who become pregnant into resigning by giving them work
that is physically demanding and by requiring unpaid overtime.282
The U.S. NAO held public hearings and released its report on
                                                       
276. See id. art. 39 (discussing the standards and procedures for applying penalties).
277. See Public Report #9702(II), supra note 215, at 43 (recommending Ministerial
Consultations for health and safety matters in the Han Young case); Public Report #9703, supra
note 215, at 72 (recommending Ministerial Consultations for health and safety matters, among
others, in the Echlin case).
278. See Public Report #9701, supra note 137, at 2.
279. See id. at 2-3.
280. See Public Communication #9701, supra note 123, at 19 (citing Article 123(A)(V) of the
Mexican Constitution and Articles 170(1)(II) and (IV)(II) of the Federal Labor Law).  Mexican
labor law entitles pregnant employees to maternity leave that includes full wages paid by their
employers.  See id.  Women who have worked for an employer for more than thirty weeks in the
previous twelve-month period receive subsidies that are shared by their employers and the
government Social Security System.  See id. at 19-20.  Women who have not worked for the
thirty-week period, however, receive maternity subsidies that are paid entirely by their
employers.  See id. at 20.  Because employers are unwilling to pay the entire cost of employee
maternity leave, they justify testing female applicants for pregnancy as a way to avoid the
financial hardship associated with newly-hired employees who require pregnancy benefits.  See
id.
281. See id. at 20-21.
282. See id. at 22 (claiming that managers mistreat pregnant workers in order to dissuade
other female employees from becoming pregnant).
January 12, 1998.283  The NAO focused its analysis on the legality of
pregnancy discrimination under Mexican law, because the NAALC
does not apply unless a violation of the law occurs.284  It found that
employment discrimination against pregnant workers violates
Mexican labor laws that prohibit dismissal or discrimination against
pregnant current employees.285  Although some women obtained
relief for illegal dismissals through CABs, the NAO found that the
available venues for reporting violations are not widely accessible to
maquiladora workers, who are often incapacitated by little education,
poverty, and the fear of being labeled as troublemakers by
maquiladora managers.286  The NAO’s findings about discrimination
against pregnant women were less decisive, due to conflicting
opinions about the legality of practice.287  Although job applicants are
not formally protected by Mexican labor laws because they lack
contracts, the U.S. NAO looked to international agreements and
Mexican governmental bodies that have questioned the validity of the
practice.288  In order to further investigate the legality of pre-hire
pregnancy testing and to more thoroughly examine the availability of
redress for illegally dismissed pregnant women, the U.S. NAO
recommended Ministerial Consultations.289
This decision is especially significant for female maquiladora
workers because of its focus on an aspect of maquiladora
employment that specifically affects women.  The U.S. NAO’s
attentive handling of the case, especially its willingness to look
beyond Mexican federal law to international law documents and non-
legal Mexican sources for opinions about pre-hire pregnancy
discrimination,290 demonstrates that the NAO system can be
responsive to problems of gender discrimination.  This decision also
shows that advocacy groups are responsive enough to female workers’
concerns to file submissions on women’s behalf.291  As with the
maquiladora submissions concerning freedom of association,
however, the lack of sanctions available under NAALC procedures for
                                                       
283. See Public Report #9701, supra note 137, at 47.
284. See id. at 33-43 (describing the NAO’s analysis of how Mexican law treats discrimination
against pregnant workers and job applicants).
285. See id. at 43-44 (reporting findings of post-hire discrimination analysis).
286. See id. at 42-43.
287. See id. at 44.
288. See id. at 34-41 (considering the prohibitions against gender-based discrimination in
CEDAW and ILO Convention 111, and the finding by the Human Rights Commission of the
Federal District of Mexico that disapproved of pregnancy screening by governmental agencies).
289. See id. at 45-46.
290. See id. at 35 (discussing sources of disapproval for the practice of pre-hire screening).
291. See id. at 2 (reporting that the authors of the report were Human Rights Watch, the
International Labor Rights Fund, and the Asociación Nacional de Abogados Democráticos).
cases of gender discrimination may hinder truly effective
enforcement of labor laws in the NAFTA free trade zone.292  In
addition, the NAO’s difficulty with the legality of pre-hire pregnancy
discrimination, because Mexican labor laws do not clearly prohibit
this practice,293 indicates the hazards of relying on an individual
country’s laws for enforcement of the workers’ rights standards that
the NAALC protects.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
It should be noted that, despite the problems outlined here, the
NAALC is a significant step toward greater recognition and
enforcement of workers’ rights, including those of female workers.294
There are, however, elements in both the NAFTA and the NAALC
that do not adequately safeguard the working conditions and living
standards of female maquiladora workers, as well as other female
workers in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  There are several
steps that should be taken to correct these shortcomings.
First, the NAALC should set uniform standards for workers’ rights
in all signatory countries, in addition to relying on national laws to
protect and enforce workers’ rights.295  National laws in Mexico, as
discussed, offer neither uniform nor adequate protection to workers.
Uniform standards should be drafted with sensitivity to the different
realities of work in the signatory nations and should set realistic
standards that can be achieved by a majority of employers in all three
countries.  These standards, however, should be significant and
specific and not merely empty suggestions.  The signatory parties
should also make commitments to treat universal standards as
minimum levels to be actively exceeded, and not merely as a ceiling
for workers’ rights.  It is especially important that uniform standards
be set guaranteeing procedural rights for union activity, including
minimum levels of due process and impartiality for grievance
procedures.  The NAALC should explicitly ensure the right to
maternity and emergency family leave and the right to be free from
                                                       
292. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (reporting that ECEs are the final
enforcement procedure available to gender discrimination cases).
293. See Public Report #9701, supra note 137, at 44 (discussing conflicting opinions about the
practice’s permissibility).
294. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 127 (listing equal pay for men and women and
nondiscrimination as enumerated labor rights in the NAALC); see also Travis, supra note 5, at
192 (speculating that general workers’ rights provisions in U.S. trade legislation may benefit
women working in maquiladoras and other similar export-processing zones around the world
by providing them with a tool for improving working conditions).
295 See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 2 (describing the parties’ obligation to enforce national
labor laws).
sexual harassment, and it should require monitoring of small and
micro-scale production facilities in the informal sector.  In addition,
the NAALC’s prohibition against employment discrimination296
should be clarified to include nondiscrimination in hiring,
promotions, and job assignments.  Finally, the NAALC should
expand the number of rights that are eligible for arbitral panel
consideration.  This will help to encourage compliance by making
more types of labor violations subject to monetary penalties when a
party displays a persistent pattern of noncompliance, in accordance
with the procedure for imposing fines.297
Second, the NAALC should ensure adequate union protection for
women in all three signatory nations so that women have an
opportunity to include their voice at the bargaining table.298  It should
do so by including enhanced procedural guarantees in the NAALC
itself and by mandating national legislation in each signatory nation
to ensure union rights.  To obtain enhanced protection for women,
the NAALC should provide standards that ensure union access to
operate in facilities where women work, especially in maquiladoras
and informal workshops.299  The NAALC should also contain
requirements that unions establish internal standards of conduct that
provide adequate procedural protections for women during union
elections and the opportunity to participate fully in the selection of
union leadership.  Unions must comply with the NAALC and
national standards that prohibit sexual discrimination and
harassment, thereby allowing female union members the freedom to
participate and make their views known.  Finally, unions should
pledge to adopt policies that prioritize issues traditionally associated
with women.  As part of this commitment, unions should recognize
the need to advocate actively on behalf of women’s concerns during
negotiations with employers.
Third, the NAALC should include explicit support for the
adoption of nongovernmental organization (“NGO”), governmental,
and corporate standards of conduct300 by companies doing business in
                                                       
296. See id. Annex 1.
297. See id. art. 39.
298. See supra note 169 (discussing the low priority of female workers within Mexican
unions).
299. See Compa, supra note 83, at 152-53 (claiming that female workers do not need special
workplace protections if they have full access to union participation and can freely advocate for
their concerns).
300. See Compa, supra note 1, at 130-31 (describing the “Maquiladora Standards of
Conduct,” which is a code of conduct for maquiladora operators promulgated by labor,
religious, and environmental groups).
Multinational corporations traditionally have not acted as “moral agents” in countries where
the NAFTA free trade zone.  The NAALC’s provisions should also call
for national legislation that provides incentives to corporations that
adopt voluntary, internal self-regulating guidelines and that pledge to
support workers’ rights actively.301  It is essential that these corporate
codes of conduct include guarantees of respect for union activity,
zero tolerance for sex-based discrimination and harassment,
compliance with environmental safety standards, and adequate
guarantees of maternity, paternity, and family emergency leave.  In
addition, these standards of conduct should encourage financial
contributions by corporations to the communities in which
production facilities are located, including support for schools,
health care, and environmental cleanup.
Finally, the NAALC should take greater steps to include NGOs,
especially Mexican women’s groups, in its procedural and substantive
activities.  These groups are already able to participate in the
operation of the NAALC because they can submit petitions to NAOs
alleging workers’ rights violations in other signatory nations.302
Because NGOs play a vital role in the promotion and protection of
women’s and workers’ rights,303 however, the NAALC should go
                                                       
they operate, nor have they been recognized as such.  See Barbara A. Frey, Legal and Ethical
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 156-57 (1997).  This lack of involvement with national social conditions
began to change, however, when human rights activists began to expose the role that
multinational corporations played in supporting human rights violations.  See id. at 157.  The
trend toward linking corporate behavior and social conditions has continued as the public and
national governments have started to pay more attention to the role that globalization plays in
the exercise of human rights around the world.  See id.  As a result of critical public opinion,
many multinational companies have voluntarily adopted corporate codes of conduct for no
reason other than to make the public feel more confident about purchasing their products.  See
id. at 157-58.  Some of the leading codes of corporate conduct that are commonly used as
models are those promulgated by Starbucks, Levi Strauss, and Reebok.  See id. at 177.
Encouragement of corporate self-regulating efforts has come from many sources.  Public
opinion, mobilized by human rights groups, consumer product activists, religious groups, and
labor unions, has been one of the most important factors.  See id. at 159.  The U.S. government
has utilized legislative and informal policy activities to regulate the operation of U.S.-based
corporations in countries with serious human rights violations and to encourage corporate
responsibility.  See id. at 168-73 (referring to the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the Burma
Freedom and Democracy Act, and other legislative and executive efforts concerning human
rights).  The United Nations, through its declarations and affiliated bodies, has also been active
in encouraging corporate activity in this area.  See id. at 165-67 (citing the U.N. Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations, which requires multinational corporations to protect
human rights).
301. There is precedent for official encouragement of corporate codes of conduct in the
Clinton Administration’s Model Business Principles (“Principles”), a voluntary set of guidelines
for U.S. corporations that do business overseas.  See Frey, supra note 300, at 172-73.  The
Principles have been criticized by human rights groups for being vague, and by business leaders
for being anti-competitive.  See id. at 173.  Despite these complaints, the Clinton Administration
plans to expand its efforts to encourage ethical corporate behavior.  See id.
302. See Herzstein, supra note 11, at 126 (describing the role that outside organizations play
in bringing labor violations to the attention of NAOs).
303. See, e.g., KAMEL, supra note 51, at 58 (describing feminist critiques of multinational
further by explicitly recognizing them as important and legitimate
voices on behalf of female workers and should encourage their role
in the operation and enforcement of the NAFTA and the NAALC.
This could be accomplished by providing government funding for
ongoing educational programming that teaches workers about their
rights and about the conditions of their counterparts in other
signatory countries.  U.S. and Mexican women’s NGOs have already
sponsored these types of programs,304  but their efforts could be
dispersed more widely and effectively with the assurance of
government funding.
CONCLUSION
It is important not to lose sight of the advances that the NAALC
represents for female maquiladora workers,305 but, at the same time,
the agreement’s substantive and procedural shortcomings for women
who work in Mexican maquiladoras should not be underestimated.306
It is especially important to address these concerns now, because it is
possible that the NAFTA, with its side agreements, could expand to
                                                       
corporations by women’s groups throughout the Third World); Abbott, supra note 39, at 996-97
(stating that women’s groups have been leaders in the increasing trend towards formal
participation by NGOs in international law formulation); Compa, supra note 1, at 130-31
(describing the history of NGO activism on maquiladora issues); Compa, supra note 83, at 170-
71 (describing the solidarity actions taken by U.S. unions on behalf of unionists in South Africa
and Guatemala); Frey, supra note 300, at 159 (reporting that NGOs have pressured
multinational corporations to consider the human rights situation of nations in which they
operate); Zulficar, supra note 50, at 1029 (advocating that NGOs should play a formal role in
the formation of international law because they are important advocates for women).
304. See, e.g., KAMEL, supra note 51, at 57-65 (describing cross-border solidarity efforts
organized by Texas labor unions and religious groups); Abbott, supra note 39, at 997
(describing “transnational issue networks” that women’s NGOs have sponsored in order to
highlight women’s concerns and develop strategies for addressing them more effectively);
Compa, supra note 1, at 130-31 (reporting joint research and programming activities by labor
unions and NGOs in Mexico and the United States).
Different organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, including unions and
religious groups, sponsored programs during the NAFTA negotiations in an effort to educate
workers about the potential effects that the trade agreement could have on their livelihoods.
See Laura Ho et al., (Dis)assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line:  Human
Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 406-07 (1996).  Several of these
programs focused specifically on female workers.  See id.  For example, Mujer a Mujer (Woman
to Woman) sponsored groups of U.S. and Canadian female workers who traveled to Mexico and
spent time with Mexican women who work in maquiladora factories.  See id. at 410 (reporting
that Mujer a Mujer began as a support network for a Mexican garment laborers’ union).
Women who went on the trip reported that the trip showed them that the NAFTA would affect
female workers in all three nations and that no one group of women could afford to isolate
itself from the others because they all shared common concerns.  See id. at 410-11.
305. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 406 (hailing the NAALC as an important breakthrough for
workers’ rights).
306. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 563 (describing the NAFTA’s potential effects as
“bittersweet”).
include other nations within the hemisphere.307  If this happens, the
problems that Mexican female maquiladora workers have
experienced under the NAFTA and the NAALC will affect even
greater numbers of women working in similar export factories.308  For
example, the same concerns for female workers that exist in the
current signatory nations regarding discriminatory labor laws and
working conditions apply to expansion candidates.309  The United
States has indicated that it will invite Chile to be the next member of
the NAFTA,310 with Argentina potentially to follow.311  This may still
occur, despite Chile’s hesitance to negotiate without U.S. fast track
authority.312  An additional obstacle to the expansion of the NAFTA is
the U.S. Congress, which has proven unwilling to grant fast track
renewal authority due to opposing concerns about, on the one hand,
expanded free trade’s detrimental effect on labor issues and, on the
other hand, unwillingness to support fast track authority that would
lead to additional labor agreements.313  Alternatively, it is possible that
the NAALC’s structure may serve as a model for labor protections in
                                                       
307. See id. at 551 (reporting that Canada and the United States will require Chile to satisfy
the NAFTA’s requirements, including labor and environmental accords, before becoming a
NAFTA member).
308. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 420 (reporting discussions of NAFTA expansion and the
creation of a hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas trade agreement which would
incorporate many other countries with maquiladora-like factories into trade pacts with the
United States).
309. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 527 (discussing patriarchal laws, inadequate union
representation of women, and women’s prominence in the informal economic sector as issues
that concern female workers in Argentina and Chile); Murphy, supra note 1, at 420-21
(hypothesizing that concerns that precluded the NAFTA’s passage will resurface when
expansion negotiations begin).
For example, shortcomings exist in the national labor laws of Chile and Argentina.  The laws
of both nations prohibit sex discrimination and require equal pay for men and women.  See
Barbieri, supra note 40, at 545-46 (discussing anti-discrimination provisions in the constitutions
and labor laws of Chile and Argentina).  Both nations’ laws, however, also include protective
legislation that prohibits women from certain types of “dangerous” work, see id. at 546-47
(discussing Chilean and Argentine prohibitions against women working at night, working in
mines, or working overtime), and mandate maternity leave policies that reinforce the images
that women exist only as mothers.  See id. at 546-48 (outlining Argentine and Chilean laws that
give social services to and restrict employment for pregnant women and new mothers).
310. See id. (discussing Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. plans to begin expansion talks with
Chile); Barbieri, supra note 40, at 526 (reporting that Presidents Clinton and Bush both
indicated that Chile is the next likely candidate for NAFTA expansion).
311. See Barbieri, supra note 40, at 550 (indicating that NAFTA signatories may approach
Argentina as an expansion candidate).
312. See Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chilean Accession to NAFTA:  U.S. Failure and Chilean
Success, 23 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 53, 100-01 (1997) (describing the Chilean reaction to
the Clinton administration’s failure to renew fast track).
313. See M. Jean Anderson, Implications of NAFTA’s Extension to Chile and Other Countries - A
U.S. View, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 227, 230 (1997) (discussing differing motives that U.S. politicians
have for opposing fast track renewal).  As of this writing, Congress has not renewed fast track
authority.
the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas,314 a proposed
hemispheric-wide free trade zone which thirty-four heads of state
endorsed at the 1994 Summit of the Americas.315  Without
modification of the NAALC structure, this approach raises the same
concerns as expansion of the NAFTA itself.  The signatories should
therefore, take steps now to make the NAFTA and the NAALC more
responsive to and less problematic for female workers in case new
countries join the agreement.
An opportunity to make these changes currently exists.  The
NAALC requires its governing body, the Ministerial Council, to
conduct a review of the NAALC’s “operations and effectiveness” after
four years of existence.316  This review process is currently ongoing.317
As a part of this evaluation, the council will be able to reconsider the
effectiveness of the NAALC and suggest necessary changes, such as
those that would benefit female maquiladora workers.
The U.S. NAO’s National Advisory Committee recently submitted
an advisory report to the NAO with its recommendations for changes
and improvements in the application and substance of the NAALC.318
Unfortunately, its recommendations do not discuss women
specifically, or any other group that may be suffering a particular
detriment under the NAFTA.  The report advocates, however, that
the evaluation process should critically examine how well the
NAALC’s substance and procedures fulfill in practice the objectives it
sets out for itself.319  It also endorses an interpretation of the NAALC
that would extend ECE review and sanctions to a much broader
scope of NAALC-violative activity.320  These are constructive ideas,
which the council’s evaluation process should consider and expand
on to make the NAALC more responsive to female workers.
If the NAALC incorporates changes that make its terms more
helpful to female maquiladora workers, its actions may highlight the
                                                       
314. See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, The Promotion of International Labor Standards and NAFTA:
Retrospect and Prospects, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 427, 472 (1995) (hypothesizing what models the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas may adopt for labor rights enforcement).
315. See id. at 427-28 (discussing origins of FTAA).
316. See NAALC, supra note 3, art. 10(1)(a) (laying out the functions of the Ministerial
Council).
317. See U.S. National Advisory Committee, supra note 216, at 1-2 (discussing the review
process and activities taken in compliance with such).
318. See id. at 35-38 (listing recommendations).
319. See id. at 37-38 (endorsing a comprehensive review of all aspects of NAALC
implementation).
320. See id. at 30-31, 38 (suggesting that NAOs apply the phrase “persistent pattern of
failure . . . to enforce” workers’ rights, the trigger standard for imposition of sanctions, to a
wider sphere of activity, including governments’ failure to ensure due process and lack of
transparency, when determining if a government has violated one of the protected rights).
need for more attention to be focused on women’s concerns
throughout the world.  This could lead to additional positive changes
in both national and international fora that might help women to
continue to gain recognition as human beings who deserve their fair
measure of rights and dignity.
